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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with analyzing the role of 
government in the distribution of aggregate income in the 
United States from 1947 to the present. The objectives are 
twofold: (1) to test the effect of social welfare expendi-
tures, taxation and tax expenditures, and inflation and 
anti-inflation policies in effecting a change in the overall 
distribution of income; and (2) to develop a theoretical 
model which explains the static distribution of income that 
has prevailed in the United States for three decades. 
The author wishes to express her appreciation to 
committee members Dr. Kenneth Kiser, Dr. George E. Arquitt, 
and Dr. Charles Edgley for their assistance in the 
production of this manuscript. 
To my children, Mike, John, and Stephanie, I express 
a heartfelt thanks. They have been unwavering in their 
support, encouragement, and understanding. Finally, I 
acknowledge my gratitude to Kent, my husband, friend, and 
advisor, who guarded my time and my privacy in order that 
this research could become a reality. 
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CHAPTER I 
SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
Joe Feagin (1975:2) notes that in this country in the 
1930's, a major depression and consequent political upheaval 
forced new government action on behalf of the destitute. 
This action resulted in the development of relief programs 
including those public assistance programs now commonly 
termed "welfare." In the 1940's and 1950's there seemed to 
be a relative decrease in government and popular concern 
with the redistribution of income. Perhaps this was the re-
sult of an emerging confidence that the "affluent society" 
had arrived. Particularly in· the 1950's both academicians 
and government officials emphasized the new wave of pros-
perity in America. In 1958, John Kenneth Galbraith heralded 
this new age in his book, The Affluent Society. Arguing 
that the United States had achieved the status of an afflu-
ent society and was in need of new economic guidance, he 
suggested that poverty survived in economic discussions 
primarily because it supported conventional wisdom, and that 
it could no longer be seen as a major affliction in the 
United States (1958:260). This theme was common among 
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members of the economic and political elite. Consequently, 
the~e were years in which policy directed toward redistrib-
uting income to the poor received only modest government 
attention. 
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Lack of interest in income redistribution in the 1950's 
was replaced by a rediscovery of poverty in the 1960's. 
Since 1964, the elimination of poverty has been an explicit 
federal government objective. When a country has estab-
lished a national objective, its citizens and leaders are 
interested in knowing how much progress has been made toward 
its achievement. This has caused a recent revival of inter-
est in ascertaining the size distribution of income across 
classes. To accurately determine the success of the War 
on Poverty, it is necessary to focus not only on the current 
economic status of the poor, but also on the current 
economic status of the nonpoor. 
Contrary to widespread popular belief, direct 
redistribution of money and services did not figure promi-
nently in early policy decisions regarding the eradication 
of poverty. Revitalization of the nation's economy was 
given high priority on the government's list of antipoverty 
measures. Fiscal stimulus in the form of a massive tax cut 
was viewed as the way to increase the nation's rate of 
economic growth and thereby reduce unemployment. The 
policy-generated increase in aggregate demand would "trickle 
down" to the poor (Haveman, 1977:4). The tight labor mar-
kets thus produced, it was argued, would create jobs and 
continual new government revenues to be spent on social 
programs (Plotnick, 1975:5). 
Governmental economic and political advisers soon 
recognized that stimulating aggregate demand would not be 
sufficient to reduce poverty significantly.· Thus, since 
1964, there has been a substantial increase in government 
expenditures which have been specifically pro-poor (e.g., 
Medicaid, Medicare, and Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children). 
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Public interest in and concern over government policy 
in distributive matters provide a rationale for scholars to 
study income redistribution. One objective of this research 
is an attempt to untangle the divergent views that surround 
the role of government policy in the redistribution of 
income. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to 
explore the conventional schools of thought regarding the 
relationship of government fiscal and/or monetary policy to 
income redistribution. 
Effect of Government on 
Income Redistribution 
The conventional view of the role of the government in 
income distribution is supported by a variety of hypotheses 
which indicate that the rise in government activities 
(budgetary and nonbudgetary) should result in a change in 
income distribution. 
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Kuznets' Hypothesis 
In a comparative study of the United States, England, 
and Germany in 1955, Simon Kuznets (1955:1-28) concluded 
that the relative distribution of income, as measured by an-
nual income incidence, had been moving towards equality 
since the 1920's. Kuznets argued that the natural trend is 
towards greater inequality due to a growing concentration of 
income earned from savings among the upper class. The fac-
tors which counteract the cumulative effect of savings upon 
the upper-income shares are legislative interference and 
political decisions. These may be aimed at limiting the 
accumulation of property through inheritance taxes and other 
explicit tax levies. Similar effects may be produced 
indirectly by government-induced inflation or by the legal 
restriction of the yield on accumulated property (e.g., rent 
controls, low, long-term interest rates maintained by the 
government to protect the market for its own bonds). 
Similarly, Kuznets argued that a natural trend towards 
greater income inequality may be offset in democratic 
societies by the growing political power of the urban lower-
income groups who enlist the aid of government through 
legislation to obtain a more adequate share of the country's 
income. 
Thus Kuznets implied that without government interven-
tion in mature capitalistic economies, the natural trend may 
be increased income inequality due primarily to a 
concentration of savings in the upper-income stratas. 
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Democratic Political Hypothesis 
The democratic political hypothesis focuses on the 
idea that through government fiscal policy (taxes and 
expenditures), the lower-income classes will ultimately 
improve their economic status via income redistribution from 
the rich to the poor. Many of the antipoverty programs of 
the 1960's were designed under the auspices of this objec-
tive. Manpower development refers to government policies, 
plans, and programs designed to upgrade the productive 
capacity and employability of those persons with the weakest 
earnings potential. Federally-supported manpower programs 
originated with the introduction of Manpower Development and 
Training (MDTA) in 1962. This program was administered by 
the Department of Labor. The Neighborhood Youth Corps, 
Operation Mainstream, Concentrated Employment Program, Work 
Incentive Program, and Public Employment Program were the 
other major programs administered by the Department of Labor 
in the 1960's to increase the productivity potential of 
lower-income groups. The Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (CETA) of 1973 was the most comprehensive man-
power planning program to be implemented by the government 
(Perlman, 1976:186-195). The manpower development programs 
all assume that if individual productivity capacity were 
heightened, the competitive market system would operate for 
the benefit of those who desired upward mobility. 
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The income maintenance programs enacted by the govern-
ment represent the second major weapon used to combat 
poverty, and thus to increase the lower-class share of 
aggregate income. They represent efforts to transfer income 
in the form of direct payments on in-kind services to the 
lower-income groups. The ideal function of the grants 
economy (i.e., system of one-way transfers) is to act as a 
higher-level regulator of the exchange economy whenever ex-
change or market processes fail to achieve economic and 
social ends. Transfers are thus necessary to offset the 
deficiencies of the market system. Other things being 
equal, it is presumed that transfers will help ameliorate 
the inequality in income distribution w~ought by failures in 
the market processes (Boulding, 1973:3-4). The primary in-
come maintenance programs include Old Age and Survivors 
Disability Insurance (i.e., Social Security), Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children, food stamps, public housing 
subsidies, rent supplements, Medicaid, and Medicare. 
Liberal Economic Hypothesis 
The normative (i.e., liberal) view of government 
budgeting that exists among public finance economists is 
that the government can be effective in redistributing in-
come, even in a predominately market economy. Those who 
adhere to this school of thought argue that the market 
mechanism alone cannot perform all economic functions. 
Public policy is needed to guide, correct, and supplement 
7 
it in certain respects. They maintain that even if all 
barriers to competition were removed, the production or con-
sumption characteristics of certain goods could not be pro-
vided for through the market. Social values require 
adjustments in the distribution of income and wealth which 
result from the market system and from the transmission of 
property rights through inheritance. Therefore the govern-
ment adopts various fiscal policies (i.e., tax and expendi-
tures) in an attempt to adjust the distribution of income 
to assure conformance with what society considers a "fair" 
state of distribution. The state of "fair distribution" 
involves considerations of social philosophy and value 
judgment. It is generally defined as: t:Q.e right a person has 
to the fruits derived from his/her endowment. Thus, dis-
tribution should be arranged so as to maximize satisfaction 
by meeting certain standards of equity. Recently attention 
has shifted from the traditional concern with relative 
income positions, with the overall state of equality, and 
with excessive income at the top of the scale to adequacy 
of income at the lower end. Thus current policies have 
emphasized prevention of poverty by setting what is consid-
ered a tolerable cutoff floor at the lower end of the income 
scale. Among various .fiscal devices, redistribution can be 
implemented most directly by a tax-transfer scheme which 
combines progressive income taxation of high-income house-
holds with a subsidy to low-income households (Musgrave and 
Musgrave, 1976:6-12). 
Popular Conceptions: Government and 
Income Redistribution 
The aforementione~ schools of thought perpetuate the 
idea that the government fiscal policy either should or 
could effect a change in the distribution of aggregate 
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income. Thus they provide support for the belief among many 
persons that the government has, in fact, effected signifi-
cant redistribution through taxes and expenditures. In the 
first instance, this is due largely to the belief that the 
tax system is progressive. In the latter instance, this 
notion is supported because many people believe that: 
government education expenditures provide significantly 
greater equality of opportunity, and th~t the social 
security system reduces poverty among the aged. 
Primarily the idea that the tax system is progressive 
stems from the fact that the nominal personal income tax 
rate structure is progressive, ranging from 14 percent of 
taxdble income in the $0-1,000 bracket to 70 percent in the 
· $200,000 and over bracket (Musgrave, 1976:234). Although 
the evidence indicates that several major taxes (e.g., 
property, sales, payroll) are either proportional or 
regressive, they are paid in a less direct fashion, and 
people are generally less aware of their relationship to 
income than they are of the relationship between personal 
taxes and personal income. 
\ 
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The belief that the welfare programs have effectively 
reduced poverty is promulgated through the notion that an 
increase in the government budget for welfare programs is 
paralleled by a decrease in the incidence of poverty. 
Statistics indicate that the federal budget for welfare 
expenditures increased by approximately $40 billion between 
1965 and 1974 (Haveman, 1977:87). Moreover, when an abso~ 
lute definition of poverty is employed, it is apparent that 
the incidence of poverty has been reduced through government 
expenditures. Using this measure, it can be documented that 
the overall poverty rate has been declining over the past 
15 years (Perlman, 1976:38). 
A clear pattern of the relationship between education 
and poverty can be documented from many sources. From the 
current statistics, it can be argued that the incidence of 
poverty falls as educational levels rise. For example, 
figures indicate that the incidence of poverty among those 
completing eight years of education is 16.2 percent, while 
the incidence among those having at least one year of 
college decreases to 2.9 percent (Perlman, 1976:25). The 
fact that government expenditures partially finance this 
investment in human capital gives added support to the idea 
that the government does effect a change in the distribution 
of aggregate income through the education process. 
There is also popular support for the belief that the 
social security program reduces poverty among the aged. 
This is due largely to the fact that some redistribution of 
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income is built into social security financing. Persons who 
earn little and thus pay low social security taxes receive 
proportionately larger benefits than individuals who pay 
high premiums. (Schiller, 1976:187). In fact, it is the 
consensus of most experts that the overall effect of trans-
fer payments in reducing poverty is most pronounced among 
the aged (Okner, 1972:74). This is due largely to the 
effect of social security. 
Review of the Literature 
In spite of the theoretical support for its alleged 
ability to do so, many scholars have challenged the popular 
belief that government has effectively redistributed income. 
The challenges have come from several directions. 
First, the Census Bureau's Current Population Surveys (CPS), 
the only reasonably consistent time series data on the size 
distribution of income in the United States, suggest that 
the aggregate income distribution has not changed signifi-
cantly since World War II. The lowest one-fifth of the 
population received 5.1 percent of the total income, and 
5.4 percent in 1974. Likewise, the highest one-fifth of the 
population received 43.3 percent of the total income in 1947 
and 41.0 percent in 1974 (see Table I). There have been 
many criticisms of this measure, including the basic income 
concept, the income unit, the accounting period, and the 
methodology (Browning, 1976:93; Budd, 1970:260; Paglin, 
1975:60). Only the first of these criticisms falls within 
the province of this study. 
TABLE I 
PERCENTAGE SHARES OF CPS INCOME, 
1947-1951 AND 1970-1974 
Families 
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Lowest 
Fifth 
Second 
Fifth 
Third 
Fifth 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Highest 
Fifth 
Top Five 
Percent 
1974 
1973 
1972 
1971 
19 70 
1951 
1950 
1949 
1948 
1947 
5.4 
5. 5 
5.4 
5. 5 
5.4 
4.9 
4.5 
4. 5 
5.0 
5. 1 
1970-1974 
Mean 5.4 
1947-1951 
Mean 4.8 
12.0 
11.9 
11.9 
12.0 
12.2 
12.5 
11.9 
11.9 
12. 1 
11.8 
12.0 
12.0 
17.6 
17.5 
17.5 
17.6 
17.6 
17.6 
17.4 
17.3 
17.2 
16.7 
17.6 
17.2 
24.1 
24.0 
23.9 
23.8 
23.8 
23.3 
23.6 
23.5 
23.2 
23.2 
2 3. 9 
23.4 
41.0 
41.1 
41.4 
41.1 
40.9 
41.8 
42.7 
42.8 
42.5 
43.3 
41.1 
42.6 
15.3 
15.5 
15.9 
15.7 
15.6 
16.9 
17.3 
16.9 
17.1 
17.5 
15.6 
17.1 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population 
Reports, Series P-60, Various Numbers of Annual 
"Money Income of Families and Persons in the 
United States." From the Conference on the Trend 
in Income Inequality in the U.S., Institute for 
Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, 
Madison, October 1976, p. 5. 
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Income included in the CPS survey is money income in 
the form of wages, net income from self-employment, social 
security, property income, government cash transfers, and 
private cash receipts (e.g., pensions, alimony, gifts). It 
excludes personal income taxes, the employee's share of 
social security taxes, other direct taxes, all public and 
private noncash transfers, all net benefits derived from 
government serv~ces, all noncash fringe benefits related to 
employment, and realized or unrealized capital gains 
(Taussig, 1976:9). 
The CPS's omission of much of the public sector's 
(i.e., government's) impact on redistribution over time has 
been the basis for recent research. First, it is known that 
the size of government expenditures as a percentage of Gross 
National Product has increased from 17.6 percent in 1940 to 
31.5 percent in 1973 (Musgrave, 1976:133). Yet this sub-
stantial increase in government expenditures is not reflect-
ed in a significant change in the distribution of income 
during the same time period, according to the CPA data. 
Second, the relative importance of noncash transfers 
has increased dramatically in the last decade. Edgar 
Browning (1976) has attempted to account for this omission 
(as well as for others) for the period 1952-1972. His 
results suggest that the omissions in the CPA data seriously 
understate the equalizing trend that has occurred during 
this period. 
13 
Browning's results have been subject to criticism on 
methodological grounds. It has been argued that his adjust-
ments to money income are rough estimates based on incom-
plete and inappropriate data. Browning acknowledges the 
validity of this criticism and argues that this merely 
illustrates the difficulty of working with aggregate cross-
section data in studying tren~s in inequality. 
Another technical difficulty associated with the 
Browning research was the fact that the distribution of 
adjusted income had to be based on family quintiles ranked 
on the basis of unadjusted money income. To the extent that 
the rankings of families change sufficiently to make ad-
justed income quintiles differ from mon~y income quintiles, 
this exaggerates the equalizing effect of an adjustment in 
a given year. It also leads to some exaggeration of the 
equalizing trend effect of adjustments for in-kind benefits, 
as these depend on the fact that total benefits to be 
allocated among quintiles increase in relative amounts over 
the time period studied (Taussig, 1976:48-49). 
Browning also makes adjustments for the effects of 
personal income taxes and social security taxes on the 
distribution of income. His conclusions are that tax 
effects have a negligible effect on trends in inequality 
despite their equalizing effect in any one year, and despite 
their growth relative to money income. 
Timothy Smeeding (1977) has made a number of important 
contributions to the study of income distribution through 
14 
the use of disaggregated microdata from the 1968 and the 
1972 CPS series. This data source allowed him to improve 
the estimates of comprehensive income by adjusting money in-
come for the cash value of in-kind transfers and for income 
and social security taxes. His results indicate that the 
income distribution shows a marked trend toward greater 
equality. 
Smeeding has been criticized for using a relatively 
short time series. He also uses the household unit as the 
basis of analysis, whereas the CPS uses family or unrelated 
individuals. The household assumes that unrelated indi-
viduals occupying the same household share income resources. 
Therefore, it is counted as one unit. The CPS measure 
counts each unrelated individual separately for purposes of 
ascertaining the distribution of income. There is no con-
clusive evidence that the household unit is the best 
approximation of an appropriate income-sharing unit. Thus, 
Smeeding's results may exaggerate the trend towards equality 
(Taussig, 1976:55). 
Morgan Reynolds and Eugene Smolensky (1977) have done 
extensive research on the redistributive effects of the 
government in the United States in 1950, 1961, and 1970. 
Their treatment encompasses the full range of government 
experiditures, taxes, and transfers. Their results differ 
from those of Browning and others (e.g., Pechman and Okner, 
1974) regarding the effect of taxes on income redistribu-
tion. Whether this is due largely to methodological 
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differences is inconclusive; for Reynolds and Smolensky make 
several specific assumptions about the incidence of taxes 
that differ from those of Pechman and Okner and Browning. 
Reynolds and Smolensky conclude that the tax system is 
decreasingly progressive over time. This would tend to 
increase inequality in the distribution of after-tax in-
comes. However, they further conclude that cash transfers 
are increasingly progressive over time. Therefore, the 
increase in inequality that would be expected to occur as a 
result of changes in the tax structure is offset by an in-
crease in cash transfers at the lower end of the income 
scale. Their final conclusion is that income distribution 
did not change significantly in the period from 1950-1970. 
The major criticisms of this study, according to 
Taussig (1976:51) are that it assumes that the underlying 
money income concept, the income unit, and the income 
accounting period used in the CPS data are acceptable as 
the appropriate bases on which distributional effects of 
government can be estimated. 
The most comprehensive account of the effects of all 
taxes at all levels of government is presented by Joseph 
Pechman and Benjamin Okner (1974). This study is unique in 
two respects: the income concept corresponds most closely 
to a comprehensive definition of income for household units, 
and estimates of total income are prepared on the basis of 
eight tax incidence (i.e., tax burdens) assumptions. For 
these reasons, this researcher has concluded that this study 
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probably gives the most accurate account of the effect of 
all taxes upon the distribution of income. The results of 
Pechman's and Okner's research will be developed more fully 
in the body of the thesis. 
Robert Haveman (1977), Robert Plotnick and Felicity 
Skidmore (1975) have compiled the results of extensive 
research on the effect of government social welfare expen-
ditures on the reduction of poverty for the period 1964-
1975. Although the focus of these volumes has been on 
evaluating the success of the War on Poverty, they include 
detailed accounts of the effect of government welfare ex-
penditures on the total distribution of income. Many of 
these results will also be more fully developed later in the 
thesis. 
The issue that is least explored at present is the 
effect of government inflation and unemployment policy on 
the distribution of income over time. The complexity of 
the inflation and unemployment processes is exacerbated 
because of their relationship to the private as well as the 
public sector. Therefore, isolating the effect of govern-
ment policies in these areas on total income distribution is 
often difficult to accomplish. Moreover, most of the 1950-
1970 period has not been marked by rapid inflation (Pohlman, 
1976:6). Thus research which adequately analyzes there-
distributional aspects of the current state of inflation 
and unemployment is not available. That which is available 
focuses on specific demographic cohorts rather than 
17 
providing a composite picture of the overall income distri-
bution. The latest efforts in this direction include the 
research of John Palmer and Michael Barth (1977). Their 
research deals primarily with the effects of high rates of 
inflation, and of anti-inflation policies on the elderly and 
low-income populations. The research will incorporate the 
results of this research in the body of the thesis. 
In an earlier work (1972), Hollister and Palmer 
researched the impact of inflation upon the poor and came 
to opposite conclusions from those derived by Palmer later 
in his work with Barth. This illustrates the difficulty in 
arriving at a conclusive understanding of the role of 
government in redistribution 6f income via anti-inflation 
policies. 
Richard and Peggy Musgrave (1976:402) represent the 
normative view held by the majority of public finance 
economists regarding the distributional aspects of the 
fiscal system. Their conclusion is that government does, 
indeed, effect significant redistribution to specific in-
come cohorts through fiscal policy. Their research shows 
evidence that the expenditure distribution is more pro-poor 
than the tax distribution is anti-rich; thus the operation 
of the fiscal system results in a significant increase in 
the share received by the lowest quartile, but only a slight 
decrease in the remaining quartiles. 
Musgrave a~d Musgrave (1976:400-401) ·issue several 
caveats with regard to their approach. First they note the 
• 
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difficulty of accurately assigning benefits and burdens by 
income class. Secondly, they acknowledge that there is some 
question of how meaningful it is to consider a burden pat-
tern which compares an average taxpayer in one income 
bracket with an average taxpayer in another bracket. They 
acknowledge that there are few average people and the 
position of individuals within each bracket is dispersed. 
This problem is serious if one takes a separate view of 
burdens and benefits when benefits tend to accrue in line 
with certain characteristics (e.g., age, employment, 
geographic location), not all of which can be shared by 
the average household. The difficulty is greatly com-
pounded if both benefits and burdens are combined. For 
instance, low-income households which pay payroll tax are 
typically not recipients of welfare payments or retirement 
pensions; while others who receive such payments do not pay 
taxes. Thus the first group may incur a heavy net burden, 
while the second receives benefits at a rate in excess of 
that shown to apply for the average household in the 
. bracket. 
This review of the current literature demonstrates the 
complexity involved in understanding the effect of govern-
ment policy in redistributing income. For the most part, 
the results are often inconclusive, conflicting, and 
ambiguous. There appear to be several reasons for this 
lack of consensus. The first involves the different 
methodologies used in various studies. Often different 
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income brackets and time periods are analyzed. Secondly, 
much of the available literature focuses on adjusting for 
various omissions in the traditional CPS data, b~t there is 
little uniformity in these adjustments across a wide spec-
trum of investigations. Thirdly, it is difficult to esti-
mate accurately the cash value of in-kind transfers (e.g., 
education, food stamps, housing, and medical care) across 
various income cohorts. Moreover, various researchers 
make different assumptions about the pattern of tax inci-
dence among income classes. Also, there is no consensus of 
opinion on how to distribute benefits and burdens across 
income classes. Lastly, much research on income distri-
bution includes variables that are not related to the role 
of government in producing income redistribution. 
Although it appears difficult from the available 
literature to arrive at conclusive evidence of how effective 
the government has been in redistributing income, it is 
possible to summarize the general conclusions of leading 
scholars regarding the relationship of the true distribution 
of income to the traditional CPS measure. There app~ar to 
be two prevailing views: (1) the CPS data are reasonably 
accurate, and the distribution pattern has not changed 
significantly since World War II; and (2) the CPS data 
underestimate a trend towards decreasing inequality of 
income distribution. The latter is generally reflected in 
a larger portion of total income received by the lowest 
quintiles than is indicated by the CPS data. This appears 
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to be due primarily to the effects of in-kind benefits which 
are excluded from the CPS data. 
The scholars who conclude that the CPS data are essen-
tially accurate, and that there has been virtually no change 
in income distribution for nearly three decades offer 
several theoretical explanations. 
One explanation is the interest-group theory which is 
often cited as the basis of American political reality 
(Boulding, 1972:6). This theory supports the view that none 
of the interest groups in America can dominate the political 
process. Thus "veto blocs" are established which act as a 
system of checks and balances (Riesman, 1950). To the 
degree that this process is successful, it would impede any 
significant redistribution of income through government 
activity as all groups in society are able to exercise power 
to promote their own se~f interests. 
Some theoreticians argue that it is not possible to 
establish theoretically a pre-fisc distribution (i.e., 
distribution without government interference). For instance 
Reynolds and Smolensky (1977:23-25) argue that a zero 
government budget is an extreme, theoretically inappro-
priate, conceptual experiment because the pre-fisc distri-
bution already reflects a host of market adjustments to 
government behavior. Thus they argue that any attempt to 
make comparisons between the pre-fisc and post-fisc effect 
on income distribution may be biased. They argue that any 
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change produced by attempting this comparison may be the 
result of a "statistical illusion." 
Those scholars whose research shows evidence of a 
decreasing inequality of income distribution argue that the 
major problem lies with the Current Population Survey 
measure. Most of the literature review tended to support 
this criticism. Because of several critical omissions of 
government activity as reflected by the CPS measure of 
income distribution, it may not reveal the actual impact 
of government influence on the distribution of aggregate 
income. 
Methodology 
i 
This study is designed to test two hypotheses: 
1. In the post- World War II capital is tic economy, 
the American government has not been effective 
in significantly redistributing income. 
2. In the present-day capitalistic society, the 
American government cannot significantly 
redistribute income. 
To "test" the first hypothesis the following procedure 
will be employed: 
a. synthesize data from the existing literature 
b. critically evaluate four major aspects of 
government activity that have an impact on 
income redistribution: social welfare ex-
penditures, taxation, tax expenditures, and 
anti-inflation policies 
The following method will be used to "test" the second 
hypothesis: 
a. develop a theoretical model which explains the 
manner in which various processes operate to 
sustain capitalistic domination of government 
tax and expenditure policies 
b. evaluate the evidence pertaining to the opera-
tion of each of these processes in the post-
World War II American economy. 
Given the nature of the model and the available data, 
it is not possible to test the hypothesis in a rigorous, 
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empirical fashion. Rather this research follows the format 
of the classical social analysis, which according to C. 
Wright Mills (1959:120-128), avoids any rigid set of proce-
dures. In classical practice, ideas are elaborated in 
close connection with some set of substantive problems. 
The classical practitioner verifies a statement by detailed 
exposition of whatever empirical materials are relevant. 
He/she takes up substantive problems on the historical level 
of reality, states the problems in terms appropriate to 
them, and states the solution in the macroscopic terms of 
the problems. The technique used in this research is one of 
historical analysis with focus upon broad patterns of social 
dynamics. • 
Plan of Study 
Chapter II of this study presents aggregate data whi~h 
assess the impact of government budget policy on income 
distribution. Its purpose is to test hypothesis one. It 
is composed of three sections. 
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Section one presents a profile of government social 
welfare expenditures and their effects upon trends in income 
inequality. It concentrates on the effect of cash and in-
kind transfers. 
The second section is designed to present a composite 
picture of the tax structure in the United States. It 
demonstrates the effects of both taxes and tax expenditures 
on the distribution of income. 
The final section discusses the. effects of monetary 
and fiscal policy and their relationship to inflation and 
unemployment. The primary emphasis is on the potential 
effects of these processes upon income distribution. 
Chapter III is designed to explain the role of ideology 
I 
in maintaining a capitalist economic system. Section one 
focuses on the conservative, or classical, economic view; 
section two describes the influence of the Keynesian doc-
trine on government fiscal policy; section three discusses 
the political elitist ideology and its relationship to the 
current capitalistic system. Section four is a radical 
perspective explaining the capitalists' use of ideology as 
a factor in maintaining the present economic system.· 
Chapter IV is devoted to examining the radical 
hypothesis. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to 
elaborate on two major functions of government. 
Section one develops the concept of the accumulation 
function of government and its relationship to capitalism. 
Both budgetary and nonbudgetary activities are discussed. 
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Section two discusses the social harmony function of 
government and its relationship to both the accumulation 
function of government and the_capitalistic economic system. 
Section three summarizes the evidence which supports 
the hypothesis that in the present capitalistic economy, 
government cannot significantly redistribute income. 
The conclusions of the study are presented in Chapter 
V. 
CHAPTER II 
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN CHANGING INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 1947-1975 
Social Welfare Expenditures 
Th~ three areas of government intervention that have 
the most direct effect on income redistribution are social 
welfare expenditures, the tax structure,: and fiscal and 
monetary policy. Unless these forces ate analyzed concomi-
tantly, the evaluation of income inequality can be distorted 
~ 
significantly. 
Until the War on Poverty was declared in 1964, govern-
ment expenditures for social welfare were relatively insig-
nificant in redistributing income. Therefore the analysis 
of social welfare policies upon income inequality will be 
confined to the years 1965-1974. 
Social welfare expenditures include all cash assistance 
programs, in-kind services, compensatory education, commu-
nity health services, and manpower training. This section 
will be concerned only with income maintenance programs 
(cash and in-kind transfers) and their effect upon income 
redistribution. 
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During the period from 1965 to 1974, the federal outlay 
for income-maintenance programs grew from $27.7 billion to 
$102.1 billion annually. This was a constant proportion of 
73-74 percent of the total federal social welfare outlays. 
More specifically, increases in cash assistance rose from 
$26,530 billion in 1965 to $75,472 billion in 1974. Total 
in-kind assistance increased from $1,198 bilion in 1965 to 
$26,616 billion in 1974 (Haveman, 1977:86). 
State and local expenditures have increased much more 
rapidly than federal expenditures. State-local expenditures 
rose from 5.6 percent of Net National Product in 1950 to 
15 percent in 1970. Federal expenditures increased more 
slowly (from 14.6 percent of NNP in 1950 to 20.4 percent in 
1970). The most dramatic increase in federal welfare 
expenditures has been for Social Security expenditures 
(6 percent of the federal budget in 1950 to 2~ percent in 
1970). The only major budget change in aggregate state and 
local outlays was a sharp growth in the share of education 
expenditures (from 24 percent in 1950 to 41 percent in 
1970). Somewhat surprisingly, public assistance and other 
transfer programs were not allotted a higher share of 
state-local budgets in 1970 than in 1950. Most of the 
changes in the size and composition of government expendi-
tures appear to be increasingly pro-poor· (Smolensky, 1977: 
47). 
The reader will recall that the Current Population 
Survey data were adjusted for cash transfers, yet they 
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excluded in-kind transfers and taxes (see Table I). Campa-
rable data with these adjustments are not available. 
However, for the year 1968, Musgrave and Musgrave have esti-
mated the distribution of income prior to government cash 
transfers. This information is presented in Table II. 
TABLE II 
PERCENT OF MONEY INCOME BY FAMILY 1968 
Estimation of 
Income Before 
Government Cash 
Transfers 
Lowest 
Fifth 
1.5 
Second 
Fifth 
9.6 
Middle 
Fifth 
17.3 
Fourth 
Fifth 
27.8 
Highest 
Fifth 
44 
Source: Richard A. and Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance in 
Theory and Practice. New York, McGraw-Hill (1976:400). 
Table III below shows the effect of cash transfers on 
income distribution for the same year. 
Because accurate data concerning pre-fisc distribution 
of income is not available (nor could it be generated), the 
researcher cannot accurately document the impact of cash 
transfers on the distribution of income. However, the 
results strongly suggest that cash transfers have had a 
substantial equalizing effect. 
TABLE III 
SHARE OF AGGREGATE INCOME BY FAMILY 
1968 (IN PERCENTAGES) 
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Lowest 
Fifth 
Second 
Fifth 
Middle 
Fifth 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Highest 
Fifth 
Income After 
Cash Transfers 5. 7 12.4 17.7 23.7 40.6 
Source: Robert Haveman, ed., A Decade of .Federal Anti-
~overty Programs. New York, Academic Press 
1977:93). 
An important shortcoming of the official CPS data is 
the exclusion of income in-kind. No information is collect-
ed regularly on the distribution of in-kind services by 
income class, although this form of assistance is the 
fastest growing component of the income maintenance system. 
In-kind transfers increased from $1,198 million in 1965 to 
$26,616 million in 1974 (Haveman, 1977:87). Not all of this 
aid goes to the lowest income classes, however. In a recent 
analysis of the 1972 federal programs, it was estimated that 
the poor (those with incomes below the officially-defined 
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poverty line), received 94 percent of surplus food commodi-
ties, 85 percent of food stamps, approximately 75 percent of 
public housing, rent supplements, and Medicaid, approxi-
mately 50 percent of Medicare and student-aid programs, and 
approximately 25 percent of Section 235-236 housing 
assistance (Haveman, 1977:94). 
The following table appears to be the best description 
available showing the effect of in-kind benefits on family 
income. Although it cannot be compared directly with data 
from the CPS, it does show the marked effect of this 
assistance. 
Income 
TABLE IV 
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL INCOME BEFORE 
AND AFTER INCOME-IN-KIND 
TRANSFERS, 1973 
(in percentages, by income class) 
Money Income- Money Income Plus 
Class Income In-Kind Income-In-Kind 
under $5,000 4.1 55.3 5.9 
$ 5,000-9,999 16.0 30.1 16.5 
$10,000-14,999 25.3 8. 8 24.8 
$15,000-24,999 33.9 5.9 32.9 
$25,000 & over 20.7 -0- 19.9 
Source: Benjamin A. Okner and Alice Rivlin, "Income Distri-
bution Policy in the United States." Processed 
(The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 
November 1974), Table 6. 
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This analysis has shown that federal social welfare 
expenditures increased significantly from 1965 to 1974. It 
has demonstrated the effect of cash benefits and in-kind 
benefits upon a more inclusive measure of family income. 
It can be seen that the impact of government expenditures 
for cash and income-in-kind transfers appears to have had a 
substantial effect in decreasing the level of overall 
inequality. 
It is instructive at this point to consider the effect 
of this increase in government spending on poverty. There 
is little doubt that government expenditures have had a 
' positive effect on reducing the incidence of absolute 
poverty (Perlman, 1976), but this does not appear to be the 
case for relative poverty. Relative poverty is a measure of 
how families compare with one another. A widely used 
measure is one that is related to the official poverty line. 
Each family's current income is divided by its official 
poverty line income, yielding an index (welfare ratio) of 
income relative to need. A family is defined as poor in the 
relative sense if it has a welfare ratio that is less than 
.44 of the median ratio for the United State population 
(Plotnick, 1975:170). 
On a relative basis, between 1965 and 1974, cash 
assistance was not large enough to reduce poverty. Thirty-
three percent of the pret~ansfer poor were taken out of 
poverty by cash transfers in 1965 'and in 1972. Thus, cash 
transfers brought a significant proportion of the population 
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closer to the median income, but not near enough to cross 
the relative poverty income benchmark. In spite of an in-
crease in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
expenditures, for example, only 15 percent of the female 
heads-of-households with children were lifted over the 
median in 1972, compared with 22 percent in 1965 (Plotnick, 
1975:176). 
While no official estimates are available of how 
correction for in-kind transfers would affect these statis-
tics, Plotnick (1975:179) asserts that more progress would 
be shown with their inclusion, but that the basic picture 
would not improve nearly as much as it appears to improve 
when the absolute measure is used. 
Assessing the overall success o~ increased government 
spending for social welfare programs in relation to income 
redistribution is extremely difficult. If success is 
measured by stability in the trend towards greater equality; 
the results are more dramatic than if success is measured 
by the reduction in the incidence of relative poverty. 
In spite of the large amount of research done on this 
topic, there are still divergent views of whether increased 
government social welfare expenditures have been significant 
in effecting a redistribution of income. Plotnick (1975: 
180) maintains that the fraction of people with incomes 
less than 44 percent of the median has grown. The growth of 
transfers over the period 1965-1972 has served to compensate 
for this increase in inequality; yet it did not reverse the 
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trend. The relative poverty measure shows the proportion of 
post-transfer poor to have been static between 1965 and 
1972, with no indications that it has decreased since then. 
Some analysts disagree with Plotnick's results. 
Haveman (1977:94) maintains that the positive effect on the 
relative income share of the lower strata attributable to 
cash and income-in-kind can be assumed to have increased 
over the last ten years as the importance of in-kind 
programs has increased. 
Morton Paglin (1975:598-609), in his recent critique 
of standard methods for assessing changes in the income 
distribution, comes to the same conclusion as Haveman. He 
notes that even 1n an egalitarian economy, family incomes 
will be unequal at any point in time because families are 
at different points in their life cycle; both older and 
younger families can be expected to have relatively lower 
incomes. Paglin shows that a considerable reduction of net 
inequality and a marked improvement in the share of the 
lowest quartile occurred between 1947 and 1972 when adjust~ 
ments are made for differences between current year and 
lifetime income. He does not adjust for income-in-kind, 
but he maintains that this adjustment would make the 
egalitarian trend even more marked. 
Okner and Rivlin (1974:20-21) also believe that the low 
percentage of the total income going to the lowest quintile 
is a built-in result of the age-income profile coupled with 
the age distribution of the population. They see the 
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inequality profile as being not purely related to the condi-
tion of a permanent class of people excluded from the 
average level of real income. 
The examples of divergent views coupled with the 
crucial omissions in the CPS data illustrate the difficulty 
in adequately assessing the true effect of government social 
welfare expenditures on the change in income distribution. 
However, an examination of other government policies that 
may affect income distribution will further the understand-
ing of what is happening to redistribution over time. 
Taxation and Income Distribution 
Edgar Browning (1976), Eugene Smolensky (1977), Joseph 
Pechman and Benjamin Okner (1974), and Musgrave and Musgrave 
(1976) have done the most thorough analyses on the effect of 
taxation on the distribution of income. The basic conclu-
sion from the results of· these studies is that the inclusion 
of all taxes has little effect in equalizing the trend of 
inequality in the income distribution over time. 
Variations in the conclusions on the effects of 
taxation on income distribution occur primarily because of 
assumptions regarding the incidence of corporation income 
taxes, property taxes, and payroll taxes. In order to 
compensate for this methodological problem, this analysis 
will incorporate the results of two extreme assumptions on 
tax incidence. 
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Variant a is the most progressive assumption. It 
assumes that half the corporation income tax is borne by 
corporate stockholders, and the other half is borne by 
owners of capital in general. Property tax is assumed to be 
paid by owners of capital in generaL Employer payroll tax 
is assumed to be borne by the employees. 
Variant b is the least progressive assumption. It 
assumes that half of the corporation income tax and property 
tax on improvements are paid by consumers through increases 
in the relative prices of housing and other goods and 
services. Employer payroll tax is also assumed to be 
shifted to the consumer. 
Under both variants, the,individua~ income tax is 
assumed to be borne by income recipients; sales taxes and 
excise taxes are ass~med to be paid by consumers; and the 
employee portion of the payroll tax is assumed to paid by 
workers (Pechman, 1974:6-7). 
Table V has been adjusted to show the effect of all 
federal, state, and local taxes on adjusted family income 
by population quintile. Note that "before tax" income in 
this table does not correspond precisely with the income 
distribution in Table III. Pechman uses adjusted family 
income to compare tax burdens throughout his analysis. 
This is defined as family income plus direct business taxes. 
Capital gains income is included in this definition. 
It is apparent from Table V that the actual redistri-
bution of income through taxation appears to be slight. 
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This result occurs largely because the progressivity and 
regressivity of various taxes tend to offset each other. 
TABLE V 
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION O.F ADJUSTED 
FAMILY INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER 
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL 
TAXES, BY POPULATION 
QUINTILE, VARIANTS 
a & b, 1966 
(percentages) 
Population 
Quintile Variant a Variant b 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Before 
Taxes 
5.09 
8.83 
16.30 
22.07 
47.71 
After 
Taxes 
5.67 
8.98 
16.38 
23.28 
45.69 
Before After 
Taxes Taxes 
5.23 5.35 
8.92 8.87 
16.70 16.26 
22.59 23.21 
46.56 46.31 
Source: Joseph Pechman and Benjamin Okner, Who Bears the Tax 
Burden? Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institute 
(1974:18). 
Revenues from the individual income tax account for 
approximately one-third of all taxes. Thus this tax should 
have substantial influence on the distribution of tax 
burdens. This tax is slightly progressive over nearly all 
the income scale, but it becomes regressive at the very top. 
This pattern belies the common notion that the individual 
income tax is highly progressive. 
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Sales and excise taxes are clearly regressive through-
out the income scale. They begin at about 9 percent at the 
lowest level (less than $3,000 adjusted family income) and 
decline to approximately 1 percent at the highest (over $1 
million adjusted family income). This reflects the fact 
that the poor spend a larger proportion of family income on 
goods and services on which the tax falls (Pechman, 1974: 
58). 
Payroll taxes are progressive for families with 
incomes up to about $19,500 and then become regressive. The 
progressivity at the lower end of the income spectrum re-
flects two conditions: (1) a larger proportion of income 
at the lower end of the distribution is in the form of non-
taxable transfer payments; and (2) many low-income workers· 
are in jobs that are not covered by the employment tax 
system. Payroll taxes are regressive above approximately 
$19,500 because they are levied at a flat rate up to a 
maximum amount of annual taxable earnings. Above this 
level, this tax accounts for a declining portion of income 
(Pechman, 1974:58). Who bears the greatest burden of 
payroll taxes, then, is determined by the extent to which 
personal income is subject to payroll taxes up to the maxi-
mum amount levied per annual income. 
The crucial factors in determining the degree of 
progressivity in the tax system as a whole are the 
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assumptions made with regard to the burden of the corporate 
income tax and the property tax. If these taxes can be 
assumed to be borne by corporate ~tockholders and property 
owners (Variant a). they are highly progressive. In this 
variant, the corporate tax rises from about 2 percent in 
the lowest quintile to 26 percent in the highest quintile. 
The property tax rises from about 2.5 percent to 10 percent 
throughout the distribution. However, in Variant b where 
part of these tax burdens are assumed to be passed on to 
consumers, progressivity virtually disappears. Since the 
I 
ratio of total consumption and housing expenditures to 
annual income falls as income rises, the burden of the 
corporation income tax in Variant b is U-shaped, and the 
! 
property tax is regressive throughout the entire scale. 
Under the most progressive assumptions, these two taxes 
amount to approximately 35.8 percent of income for families 
with income over $1,000,000, and only 10.6 percent for 
families with income over $1,000,000 under the least 
progressive assumptions (Pechman, 1974:60). 
Although state and local taxes are generally believed 
to be regressive, this conclusion is only true under a 
specific set of tax burden assumptions. Under the least 
progressive set of assumptions, Variant b, these taxes are 
regressive. Under the most progressive set of assumptions, 
these taxes form a U-shaped pattern. 
Table VI shows the effective rates of federal, state, 
and local taxes by deciles. This shows that overall, 
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federal taxes are progressive throughout the distribution 
under both sets of assumptions, while state and local rates 
retain their regressive pattern only under the least 
progressive set of assumptions. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis by 
Pechman and Okner (1974) as well as from similar results in 
Reynolds and Smolensky, Musgrave and Musgrave are that the 
tax system has little effect in the distribution of income. 
Under the most progressive set of assumptions, taxes 
reduce inequality by less than 5 percent when measured in 
terms of Gini coefficients. Under the least progressive 
assumptions, income inequality is reduced by only .25 
percent (Pechman, 1974:64). 
Tax Expenditures and Income 
Distribution 
While this researcher would concur with the results of 
Okner and Pechman, there is one aspect of the tax system 
that is often overlooked when analyzing the effect of taxa-
tion on income distribution. Tax preferences (tax loop-
holes) are not taken into account in any of the afore-
mentioned studies. Tax preferences arise from the exclusion 
of certain items which should be included and the deduction 
of others which should not be deducted. Both have important 
implications for the trend in inequality that has continued 
in this country. 
Population 
Decile 
1 
3 
5 
7 
10 
Federal 
7.8 
13.5 
15.9 
16.2 
21. 1 
TABLE VI 
RATES OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL 
TAXES, VARIANTS a AND b, BY 
POPULATION DECILES, 1966 
(in percentages) 
Variant a 
State & Local Total Federal 
9. 1 16.8 13.8 
8.2 21. 7 15.8 
6.9 22.8 17.4 
6. 5 2 2. 7 17.5 
9. 0 30.1 19.2 
Variant b 
State & Local Total 
13.7 2 7. 5 
10.2 26.0 
8.4 25.8 
8.0 2 5. 5 
6.6 25.9 
Source: Joseph Pechman and Benjamin Okner, Who Bears the Tax Burden? Washington, D.C., 
The Brookings Institute (1974:64). 
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While it is debatable just which provisions constitute 
tax preferences, it is evident that the revenue cost of 
existing preferences is substantial. The Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974 applies the term "tax expenditures" to 
tax subsidies to preferred taxpayers. They are defined as 
revenue losses attributable to provisions of the federal 
tax laws which allow a special e~clusion, exemption, or 
deduction from gross income or which provide a special 
credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax 
liability. 
The major tax expenditures are: (1) personal deduc-
tions under the individual income tax (e.g., state and local 
I 
I income taxes, sales taxes, property tax~s, gasoline taxes, 
charitable contributions, medical expenses, interest paid); 
(2) the exclusion of state and local bond interest, employee 
benefits, and transfer payments; (3) the preferential treat-
ment of long-term capital gains; and (4) tax incentives to 
promote investment (e.g., investment credit and accelerated 
depreciation for child care facilities). (Pechman, 19 77: 
431). 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1976:265) argue that these tax 
expenditures constitute a loss of approximately 30 percent 
of potential federal revenue yield. To put it somewhat 
more succinctly, the same revenue could be obtained from 
the comprehensive base while cutting tax rates across the 
board by 30 percent! The lost revenue in the form of tax 
expenditures amounted to over $124 billion in 1978. 
' 
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The existence of preferences would be of little concern 
if reductions in the tax base due to tax preferences were a 
fixed proportion of the full base for all taxpayers. How-
ever, this is not the case. These preferences result in 
significant vertical and horizontal inequities. 
The dissimilarities in vertical equity are the most 
pronounced in tax savings from capital gains and state and 
local interest deductions. The-se savings accrue primarily 
to the upper~income groups. Homeowner preferences and life 
insurance are most significant for middle-income groups. 
Transfer benefits accrue largely to the lower-income groups 
(Musgrave, 1976:264-269). These tax savings are relatively 
high at the bottom and top ends of the income scale, but 
comprise a rather constant percentage of full tax over the 
range from approximately $10,000 to $100,000 of adjusted 
gross income. Most of the taxpayers fall within this range; 
thus the existence of preferences results in a more-or-less 
proportional tax reduction for this group. Obviously, the 
two groups who benefit the most from tax preferences are 
located in the extreme tails of the income distribution 
(Musgrave, 1976:267). 
The most profound inequities resulting from preferen-
tial tax treatment occur within the same income brackets 
(i.e., horizontal inequities). For instance, in the 
$50,000-100,000 bracket, 6 percent of taxpayers paid a 
20-30 percent average tax rate, and 53 percent of taxpayers 
paid a 30-40 percent average tax rate. Also in this group, 
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the fraction of taxpayers paying over 30 percent actually 
declines from the $500,000 group as a result of preferential 
tax treatment (Musgrave, 1976:269). 
It is evident that the income tax preferences involve 
a high degree of horizontal inequity, especially at high 
income levels. The most obvious conclusions to be drawn 
from the work of Musgrave and Musgrave regarding preferen-
tial tax treatment are: (1) tax preferences result in a 
substantial revenue loss. Adoption of a full base would 
permit an average rate reduction of one-third without any 
revenue loss; (2) tax preferences show the most. inequity 
horizontally in the upper taii, although they are apparent, 
to some extent, throughout the entire scale; and (3) there 
i 
are sharp reductions in liabilities in the extreme ends of 
the distribution scale with a more-or-less constant 
proportional reduction over a wide middle range. 
The reader will recall that the CPS measure of income 
distribution omits the effects of taxation on the distribu-
tion. In this section the researcher has examined this 
omission in order to ascertain if, in fact, the inclusion of 
taxes would change the overall picture of income distribu-
tion. It appears to be the general consensus of the experts 
in the field that the effect of taxation does not signifi-
cantly alter the overall distribution of income. The effect 
is noticeable in both the extreme upper and lower ends of 
the scale, but it is not substantial enough to change the 
overall composition of income distribution. The effect of 
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increasing payroll taxes appears to be offset, for instance, 
by tax preferences to the group where this effect would be 
the most regressive. This is not to say that there is not 
substantial horizontal inequity, primarily because of tax 
preferences, but even this effect would not change the over-
all distribution pattern. 
This researcher would argue, however, that the chief 
inequity of preferential tax treatment results from the 
treatment of capital gains. Over half of the capital gains 
is received by families in the highest quintile (Browning, 
1976:916). At this level of income, payroll taxes are 
highly regressive. Therefore, it would seem that the middle 
quintiles, who. receive most of the other half of the 
capital gains benefits bear most of the burden of the pay-
roll tax. This tax is used to finance the bulk of transfer 
payments to the lowest quintiles. Using this logic, it does 
not appear that the official statistics reflect the true 
picture of the effect of tax expenditures on income 
redistribution. 
However, there is an important aspect of tax 
preferences on capital gains that merits attention. Morton 
Feldstein and Joel Slemrod (1978:118) have examined the 
effect of inflation on the taxation of realized capital 
gains. Their study presents evidence which shows that taxes 
on capital gains are grossly distorted by inflation. 
Current capital gains taxes are levied on the difference 
between the original cost and the selling price of assets. 
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Because the latter rises as a result of inflation, this 
substantially increases the effective tax rate on real 
price-adjusted capital gains. Their research presents 
evidence to show that an 8 percent inflation rate produces 
an effective capital gains tax rate equal to 100 percent. 
When this aspect is considered, the preferential tax treat-
ment of capital gains does not seem to award benefits to the 
upper quintiles to such a striking degree. 
Inflation, Unemployment and 
Income Distribution 
The detrimental effects of high rates of inflation 
(e.g., 1974, 11.0 percent; 1975, 9.1 percent) on the well-
being of specific groups in the population is a subject of 
current concern. Anti-inflation policies generally result 
in higher unemployment rates. This creates additional 
hardships on groups that are already experiencing a loss of 
real income due to inflation. 
While there is general agreement that everyone is 
bearing the cost of the current economic situation to some 
extent, little research has been done to ascertain what 
effect inflation and unemployment have on income distribu-
tion. This section will be devoted particularly to 
assessing the impact of inflation and unemployment on 
specific income groups. The effect of inflation on the 
economic status of various income levels will be examined 
in three categories: cost of living, wealth and taxes. 
Then anti-inflation policies and their effects on income 
distribution will be explored. 
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One way the effect of inflation can be determined is 
to focus on the increase of the price of commodities pur-
chased by particular income groups. This is important when 
differences exist in the price increases in commodities 
relative to the composition of consumption expenditures 
across income stratas. 
The measure of overall price increases most commonly 
referred to is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). This index 
is heavily weighted by the typical bundle of goods bought 
by middle-income urban families. To the extent that lower-
income families spend a disproportionately large share of 
their income on food and housing (goods whose prices have 
risen disproportionately fast), the CPI understates the 
true impact of inflation on this group. 
To examine the extent to which different groups are 
affected by differential price increases because of dif-
ferential expenditure patterns, Palmer and Barth (1977:204) 
constructed a price index for different broad income groups. 
These are referred to as the Poor Person's Price Index and 
a High Income Person's Price Index. These indexes were 
constructed by using data on consumption patterns plus a 
weighted price index to determine the differential prices 
paid by the lowest and highest income quintiles for the 
same bundle of goods that comprise the Consumer Price Index. 
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The CPI then serves as an index of prices paid by middle-
income families. The results of this research are shown in 
Table VII. 
TABLE VII 
PRICE INDEXES FOR THREE INCOME GROUPS 
Poor Person's High Income Person's 
Year Price Index CPI Price Index 
1967 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1969 110.00 109.8 109.70 
1971 121.3 121.3 121.00 
1973 135.3 133.3 132.50 
1974-January 143.1 139.7 138.90 
July~l974 151.1 148.3 147.50 
Source: John Palmer and Michael Barth, "The Distributional 
Effects of Inflation and Higher Unemployment." 
In Eugene Smolensky, ed., ImEroving Measures of 
Economic Well-Being, New Yor , Acamedic Press (1977:205). 
These indexes demonstrate the differential effect of 
cost-of-living increases for the population. It is apparent 
that the greatest hardship is on the lower-income groups, 
especially during 1973 and 1974. Since necessities com-
prise a larger share of their budget, and because this 
group is already existing on the margin, they are less able 
to ameliorate the impact of higher prices of their normal 
consumption purchases. 
Another way inflation affects income distribution is 
its impact on the real value of net worth (i.e., assets 
owned less debts owed). The effect of inflation on any 
particular household is determined by the composition of 
that household's liabilities and assets. 
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In general the current values of tangible assets in-
crease as the general price level increases, so that 
inflation leaves the real value of this component of net 
worth virtually unaffected. Tangible assets include physi-
cal items such as homes and automobiles. Similarly, 
intangible assets (i.e., common stock, mutual funds) tend 
to increase in the long run, although there is a lag time 
before these assets increase in real value relative to 
inflation increases. 
Therefore, adverse effects of inflation affect the two 
remaining components of net worth: fixed dollar assets 
(i.e., cash, bank accounts, bonds) and liabilities. As a 
general rule, fixed dollar assets decline in value with 
increased inflationary rates. Liabilities, on the other 
hand, decrease in real value as inflation rates increase. 
For unintended inflation, then, the effect is to reduce the 
real net worth of those individuals whose fixed dollar 
assets exceed their holdings of fixed dollar liabilities. 
For persons whose liabilities exceed fixed assets, inflation 
tends to increase their net worth. 
48 
Palmer and Barth (1977) have examined various demo-
I 
graphic groups and observed the following trends with regard 
to the impact of inflation on net worth: (1) When grouped 
according to income levels, the most substantial declines in 
real net worth occur among the lowest income groups and the 
highest income groups. Highest income groups have many 
assets that do not appreciate in real value; they also have 
fewer fixed-dollar liabilities. The lowest classes have 
few assets or liabilities, but those they do have are heavi-
ly concentrated among the fixed-dollar variety. However, 
among the lowest class, the losses will be concentrated 
among a relatively small number of poor who have assets 
I 
whose values decline with increasing inflationary rates. 
(2) Increases in net worth occur among middle and upper-
middle income groups where debts are large and assets are of 
the tangible variety. When age is a factor·, the young, who 
are often heavily in debt for assets of the tangible 
variety, find their net worth is increased as a result of 
higher inflation rates. The aged who benefit from inflation 
are those with assets of the tangible or intangible variety 
rather than the fixed-dollar types. 
This group represents a small percentage of the total 
aged. Most of this group receive the bulk of their income 
from transfer payments which have built-in inflationary 
increases. Only approximately 2 percent of aged households 
depend heavily on income from pensions. This group suffers 
• 
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a significant decrease in real net worth from inflationary 
pressure. 
In general Palmer and Barth (1977:205-209) conclude 
that the effect of inflation upon net worth redistributes 
real income away from the poor and the very rich and toward 
the middle and upper-middle income households. However, 
they maintain that losses among the poor will be concen-
trated among a relatively small number of the poor. They 
further conclude that inflation will distribute away from 
older households and toward younger households; but that 
los~es among older households will be concentrated among 
those with moderate to high incomes. 
I 
The effect of inflation on tax incidence can lead to 
more than the proportionate increases in income tax 
liabilities that the researcher demonstrated to exist in 
the previous section. Inflation-induced wage increases 
can cause a household to pay a higher marginal tax because 
the tax laws do not have a provision for inflation-induced 
income increases. However, the consumption behavior of the 
household receiving an inflation-induced wage increase does 
not change. Therefore, as prices rise, the consumption 
taxes they pay also rise. The net result is that all tax 
units, no matter what their income, will realize after-tax 
wage increases that are less than the increase in the cost 
of living. They not only pay taxes on their cost-of-living 
increases, but they pay a higher percentage in taxes on the 
increase in income than they pay on the base income. This 
leaves them with spendable income that does not grow 
concomitantly with the increase in the cost of living 
(Palmer and Barth, 1977:210)~ 
so 
Although the redistributional effects toward the middle 
classes are not strong, it is apparent that the lower-income 
taxpayers suffer the greatest proportional increase in the 
tax burden (i.e., the ratio of taxes to income). To the 
extent that this groups spends a disproportionate share of 
their income on items subject to sales taxes, this ratio of 
taxes to income would increase. 
The work done by Palmer and Barth (1977) represents the 
latest effort to determine the effects of inflation on the 
distribution of income. However, the authors do not attempt 
to redistribute income according to the traditional classi-
fication by quintiles; nor do they examine data for house-
holds with income higher than three times the poverty level. 
This focus prevents any attempt to measure the trend toward 
greater/lesser inequality among income classes as the result 
of inflation. As was pointed out in an earlier section of 
this paper, the highest quintiles pay much higher effective 
tax rates on realized capital gains due to inflationary 
pressure. However, data to show the impact of these condi-
tions on the actual distribution of income are not 
available for comparison. 
The effect of inflation upon the lowest income groups 
can be determined, however, from this study. Palmer and 
Barth (1977:226-228) conclude that the combined effects on 
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net worth of taxation and inflation are significant for 
various demographic groups within the lowest income stratas. 
Their conclusions are: 
1. The aged poor who receive most of their income 
from transfer payments are fairly well pro-
tected against inflation. Less than one-fifth 
of this group have income taxable sources, and 
those who do are below the taxable level. Thus, 
they do not bear an increased tax burden. The 
two percent of this category who have private 
pension income, however, will find it has been 
seriously eroded by increased inflation. 
2. The aged with income levels one to three times 
the poverty level are hurt more severely by 
inflation. Nearly 52 percent of this group 
had total incomes of which at least 51 percent 
were comprised of earnings or fixed-money 
incomes. Inflation has had a serious detri-
mental impact upon this group. 
I 
For the aged or disabled popul~tion as a 
whole, the greater the dependence on income 
from fixed sources, the greater are the detri-
mental effects of rising inflation rates. 
3. The group of the lower quintiles who feel the 
effects of inflation most severely are the 
nonaged males. Of this group, earnings corn-
prise approximately 84 percent of their total 
incomes. Therefore, they experience higher 
tax burdens, loss of purchasing power and 
falling real wage rates. The higher the 
household is in the income range studied by 
Palmer and Barth, the more income is depend-
ent upon earnings, and the more severely it 
is hurt by inflation. This effect tends to 
decrease somewhat towards the middle of the 
income distribution when liabilities, which 
decrease in real value during periods of 
inflation, become large enough to exceed 
fixed-dollar assets. 
The research by Andrew Brimmer (1971) on the effects 
of inflation and income redistribution is relatively out-
dated because it considers the impact of inflation on 
income redistribution only up to the year 1968. However,. 
he makes some interesting observations that are still 
applicable to the current state of affairs. He indicates 
that the slight increase toward more equality between the 
years 1965-1968 (e.g., an increase in the lowest two quin-
tiles' share of income) was due primarily to the increase 
52 
in multi-earner families within those stratas. He presents 
evidence to show that there was a virtual cessation of 
single-earner families among these groups and a rapid 
acceleration of two, three, and more earners per family. He 
emphasizes that these data are important because they inci-
cate that families with earnings income have offset the 
impact of stagnant real wages by increasing the number of 
workers per family. 
To understand the impact of anti-inflation policies 
upon unemployment, it is necessary to understand the general 
manner in which these programs operate. Then it is possible 
to focus on the distribution of unemployment and earnings 
losses which accompany anti-inflation policies. 
The most commonly used tactic to combat inflation is to 
reduce the aggregate demand for goods and services. The two 
primary tools for accomplishing this are fiscal and monetary 
policy. Fiscal policy refers to the government's management 
of taxation and expenditures. By raising taxes and/or 
reducing its own expenditures, the government can effect a 
reduction in demand for goods and services, as business 
firms have less money to spend for these goods and services. 
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Monetary policy refers to the Federal Reserve System's 
management of the growth of the money supply and resulting 
alterations in interest rates and the availability of 
credit. When it is more difficult to borrow money, fewer 
purchases are made. 
Both policies have the same initial impact: employers 
respond to reductions in the demand for their goods and 
services by decreasing employment or by reducing the number 
of hours employees work. The short-term result is a rise 
in unemployment rates. 
The direct effects of unemployment are not distributed 
evenly throughout the population. Those in the lowest 
i 
income stratas are particularly susceptible to forced unem-
ployment tactics. For instance, blacks and teenagers have 
a much higher unemployment rate during periods when anti-
inflation policies are operant than do the rest of the 
population. These groups are often not cushioned by bene-
fits from unemployment insurance, as they are dispropor-
tionately over-represented in employment sectors that do 
not offer this coverage. 
Also, anti-inflation policies reduce number of hours 
worked. It has been estimated that the reduction in hours 
worked by family heads is about 40 percent greater than the 
reduction accounted for by measured unemployment (Gramlich, 
1974:243). 
In his research concerning the distributional effects 
of higher unemployment, Gramlich (1974:243-336) came to the 
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following conclusions: the unemployment of those with the 
lowest income is the most sensitive to cyclical unemploy-
ment. For example, a male head of a poor family is one and 
one-half times as likely to be unemployed as a similar per-
son with income at three times the poverty line. Further-
more, male unemployment rises at a faster rate than does 
female unemployment during these same periods. Blacks face 
higher unemployment rates than do whites during these fluc-
tuations. Poor families headed by black males suffer, on 
the average, as a result of earnings reductions, a 4 percent 
decrease in family income for each 1 percent increase in the 
unemployment rate. The comparable figures for white males 
and all females are 3 percent and 1 percent respectively. 
The lower labor force activity of females in general tends 
to make their incomes less susceptible to changes resulting 
from employment fluctuations when these are measured 
aggregately. 
At higher levels of income, the expected losses due 
to unemployment fall steadily for male-headed families, 
and at first increase and then decrease for female 
heads-of-households. 
For families with incomes less than the poverty line, 
the average earnings loss due to a one percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate is nearly 8 percent of 
their income. For male-headed families at five times the 
poverty line, the decrease in income loss is reduced to 
5.4 percent. 
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Some of this loss of income is offset by transfer 
payments. The Gramlich study estimates that for those who 
are eligible, unemployment insurance amounts to 70 percent 
or 80 percent of previous disposable income. However, only 
52 percent of males and 22 percent of females qualify for 
this insurance. AFDC payments and food stamps also help 
cushion the effects of loss of income due to unemployment. 
Their effects depend on residential location and on the 
level of earned income. Gramlich estimated that in 1971, 
the effects of all transfer programs cushioned the loss of 
income by 10 percent for the highest income group (male-
headed), and up to 36 percent of those male-headed 
households at the poverty line. 
Barth and Palmer (1977:238) conclude that anti-
inflation policies have the effect of putting the greatest 
hardship on those least able to bear it. While transfer 
programs prove to be a significant mitigating force for 
those who qualify, some families will nevertheless suffer 
substantial income losses, perhaps ranging up to as high as 
40 percent of pre-unemployment income. 
A more subtle effect of anti-inflation policies is 
their effect on lifetime earning potential. There is 
evidence to indicate that lifetime earnings are partially 
dependent upon work experience and on-the-job training. 
When labor demand is slack, fewer persons are able to gain 
this experience, and those who do work tend to experience 
more limited opportunities for promotion. Thus, the 
potential for lifetime income gains is reduced during 
periods when anti-inflation policies are a major social 
endeavor. These losses may be irretrievable; and this 
burden is borne disproportionately among those who are 
least able to afford it (Palmer and Barth, 1977:230). 
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Because governmental policies to combat inflation 
involve more than attempts to curb demand, an accurate esti-
mate of their effect is difficult to obtain. Also, because 
there is a long lag between the implementation of various 
governmental fiscal and monetary policies and the collec-
tion.of current aggregate data, the actual effects of these 
procedures are difficult to determine. This section 
presented a simplistic view of the manner in which govern-
mental intervention via monetary and fiscal policies affects 
aggregate income redistribution by outlining trends that. 
these policies are likely to produce. The most salient 
point to be gained from this section is that fiscal and 
monetary policies can have a measurable influence on the 
direction of increased/decreased inequality. It should be 
apparent, as well, that certain groups of the population 
do benefit from periods of inflation. For these reasons, 
there is a divergence of opinion among experts as to what 
is the best policy to implement in order to benefit the 
greatest number of people. 
Summary 
This chapter analyzed the effect of government in 
redistributing income since World War II. The technique 
used was to evaluate existing research on government poli-
cies that most directly affect redistribution: social 
welfare expenditures, taxation, anti-inflation, and unem-
ployment policies. The following general conclusions can 
be made: 
1. The increase in social welfare expenditures 
has had the effect of reducing the incidence 
of absolute poverty, especially since 1964. 
This is reflected by a slight increase in the 
lowest quintile's share of total income. 
2. The inclusion of all taxes (federal, state, 
and lo~al) does not appear to change the 
degree of inequality. Taxes are shared pro-
portionately over most of the income spectrum. 
3. The effects of inflation are not uniformly 
distributed. With regard to net worth, infla-
tion tends to redistribute real income away 
from the poor and the very rich and toward 
the middle and upper-middle income classes. 
The net worth of the poor is reduced only to 
the extent that their income is comprised of 
the fixed-dollar variety. Non-aged males 
whose income is in the form of earnings are 
the most seriously affected by inflation. 
This is more acute in the lowest income quin-
tiles. Inflation-induced wage increases 
affect all income cohorts, but its effect 1s 
most marked in the lower-income classes. 
4. Anti-inflation policies result in increased 
unemployment. Those with the lowest incomes 
are the most sensitive to cyclical unemploy-
ment. Some families suffer income losses 
up to 40 percent because of this phenomenon. 
5. Several government transfer programs have 
built-in inflationary clauses. The recipi-
ents of payments from these programs are 
57 
---------
--------
cushioned, to some extent, to the effects of 
both inflation and unemployment. 
The pre~eding results appear to indicate that govern-
ment budget policy has been unsuccessful in redistributing 
income during the post-World War II period, with the 
exception of a slight degree of redistribution from the 
highest to the lowest quintile. 
The remainder of this thesis will be devoted to the 
development of a theoretical model which provides an 
explanation for the static income distribution that the 
American society has exemplified from 1947 to the present. 
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CHAPTER III 
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAINTENANCE OF 
AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
Introduction 
According to Solo (1974:106), an ideology is any set of 
the individual's ideas concerning what is and what should/ 
should not be. Ideology is the individual's notion of what 
should be done, framed within his conception of what is 
possible. For any field of choice and a'ction, an individual 
may call upon a different and distinct set of ideas or 
values. Choice and action operate by reference to a cluster 
of ideologies. In this vein, ideology is not a set of 
images, but an image-forming, judgmental process, a choice-
making, problem solving capability. 
The ideological cluster is a working instrument of the 
I 
individual mind, but the ideologies of the cluster are prod-
ucts of society. They are received by individuals through 
acculturation, education, endoctrination, and all else that 
denotes the transmission and propagation of ideas and 
images. Hence, Solo (1974:106) argues that the following 
statement might be made regarding the social function of 
ideologies: 
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1. Ideologies convey legitimacy and status. 
2. For the survival of a society, it is imperative 
that the ideologies be held in common. Hence, 
social institutions protect and propagate sup-
portive ideologies; and conversely, they resist 
idedlogical deviation and oppose ideological 
change. 
3. "Prevailing ideologies" denote an ideological 
cluster that is generally accepted by those 
who participate in that complex of functional 
interactive systems called society. It is not 
necessary that everyone who participates in 
the social functions believes in the ideology 
in order that it can prevail. What is neces-
sary is that it be accepted as the operational 
basis for choice and interaction. Once an 
ideology has been established and embodied in 
institutions and behavioral patterns, it is 
difficult for any individual to do other than 
accept it as a basis for choice and 
interaction. 
This is true because ideology that once prevails is 
made manifest in poiitics, in behavior patterns, and in 
institutions such as the Army, the State Department, 
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churches, and universities. These institutions, through the 
manner and means of renewing themselves in recruitment, 
training) and indoctrination, and through the self-interests 
of its participants in protecting their status, continue to 
act out the ideology. This occurs even when there may be 
considerable diversity between the values enbodied in the 
ideology and the individual's observation and/or perception. 
Thus, Solo (1974:106) states, a given society may be 
characterized by numerous and diverse ideological sets, 
each established and having an institutional embodiment and 
finding their modus vivindi in the relationship of 
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domination and subordination, and in the demarcation of role 
and function. 
To the extent that ideology grovides the blueprint for 
individual behavior, for institutional organization, and for 
social policy, an analogy can be made to the ancient 
philosopher who contemplated a river. He noted that while 
everything was perpetually changing, nothing changed. So it 
may be in society. Politicians are elected or rejected. 
One party comes in while another goes out; yet the political 
process is the same. Income generates expenditures and 
expenditures generate income. X may get richer· and Y may 
become poorer; yet the market process is the same. Its 
institutional structure remains. Its distributional mode 
remains. There is flux without change. 
This chapter will develop the manner in which a dis-
tinct cluster of ideologies has been influential in sus-
taining a capitalist economic system. This cluster is 
composed of the laissez-faire (i.e., classical economics) 
ideology, the Keynesian ideology, and the elitist political 
ideology. 
Laissez-faire (Classical 
Economics) Ideology 
Adam Smith, an 18th century English economist, laid the 
groundwork for what became the methodology of classical 
economics. Smith sought a laissez-faire state which would 
be characterized by an absence of state controls, subsidies, 
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and regulations. Smith believed that by replacing state 
power with market competition, power would be dispersed. 
This "invisible hand" of the market would serve to transform 
individual self-seeking into social well-being. He argued 
that each individual pursuing his own selfish interest would 
most effectively promote society's interest without any 
political interf~rence. Thus, Smith argued that the system 
of free competition was self-regulating and would render the 
entreprenuer accountable to the consumer interest and 
responsible to public goals. Moreover, the market could be 
viewed as a means to achieve social ends (e.g., stability, 
growth, freedom, and equity) and to maintain the relation-
ships within the system (Solo, 1974:30-~2). 
In this tradition, redistribution via the government 
to offset the effects of unemployment or lack of opportunity 
is neither necessary nor proper. It is not necessary be-
cause the competitive capitalist system, without government 
intervention, will assure full employment and promote 
economic growth. Although the status quo is accepted as 
"given" in this scheme, it is assumed that all individuals 
could achieve upward mobility through their own efforts. 
Government intervention to redistribute income is not proper 
because the classical economists believed that income should 
be based on productivity, and that income derived from 
market activity closely reflected the productivity of each 
basic resource. Thus, the market was believed to provide a 
just, or fair, distribution of income. 
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Keynesian Ideology 
The laissez-faire self-regulating price system ideology 
dominated economic policy in the United States until the 
1930's when the Great Depression spawned widespread unem-
ployment which the private sector could not absorb. The 
Keynesian doctrine, espoused by John Maynard Keynes, was 
concerned principally with alleviating.unemployment through 
government intervention. The objective was to raise aggre-
gate demand, and thus lower unemployment, through increased 
government purchases, transfer payments, and/or reduced 
taxes on the private sector. 
Basically, the government has two tools with which to 
implement the Keynesian doctrine: monetary policy and 
fiscal policy. The more powerful of the two, according to 
Keynes, was fiscal policy (i.e., tax and expenditures). 
The New Deal reforms and the massive spending during World 
War II utilized these poli~ies; and as Keynes predicted, the 
economy surged and unemployment plunged to record lows. 
Both the Kennedy and Nixon administrations applied the 
Keynesian doctrine to economic policy. However, its pri-
mary purpose has not been to redistribute income. In 
Keynes' original presentation, changes in taxes or expendi-
tures could be designed for the benefit of any income class. 
Thus the manipulation of aggregate demand by the government 
could.redistribute income from the rich to the poor as well 
as decrease unemployment. Because of its application 
towards selected societal groups, however, the Keynesian 
doctrine has had the effect of maintaining, to a great 
extent, the status quo and preser~ing the capitalistic 
economic system. 
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In summary, today's Keynesians continue to analyze and 
to prescribe in terms of marginal adjustments and aggregate 
policies designed to maintain rather than to change the 
socio-economic structure (Solo, 1974:385-395; Pohlman, 
1976:66-71). 
Though the influence of economic theory and ideology 
on policy decision making has had the manifest function of 
stabilizing the economy through market competition followed 
by government manipulation of aggregate demand, the latent 
consequence has been to establish firmly a public sector 
(government) which reflects the interests of the capitalist 
elite. 
Elitist Political Ideology 
Many social theorists assume the existence of political 
pluralism as their basis for analyzing the state. The 
fundamental premise underlying this ideology is that equity 
can be obtained via the political process. This scheme 
denies that any single group can dominate state policy; for 
pluralism assumes sovereignty resides in the voter. 
Political outcomes depend upon competition among those vying 
for votes. Competing elites may take the initiative 1n 
public affairs; but at the same time, they must take 
account of the interests of ordinary citizens on whom they 
depend ultimately to support their policies (Watson, 1975: 
22). 
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This view has enveloped the ideology of elite pluralism 
which emphasizes the competitiveness of political elites, 
their accountability to the electorate via periodic elec-
tions, and the open, multiple points of access to elite 
power for those who wish to voice their grievances and 
demands (Bachrach, 1967:8). 
This pluralistic structure icts as a buffer between the 
masses and the elites. In insulating each from the other, 
it protects the democratic system from the vulnerability of 
mass politics by allowing the .established elites to fulfill 
their role as guardians of the system (Kornhauser, 1959: 
230). 
The elitist political ideology is based primarily on 
the contention that the best interests of a free people 
depend upon the ability of the "gifted" to command deference 
of the many for the well-being of all. The application of 
this ideology assumes that public interest is realized when 
government policy is in accord with the judgment of the 
elite. 
Summary of Ideologies 
What has evolved is a cluster of ideologies which 
ignores the underlying social reality, but which perpetuates 
capitalism and its inherent system of unequal distribution 
of resources. 
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The laissez-faire ideology has ceased to dominate 
economic theory, yet the spirit of entrepreneurship is still 
alive, well, and improving, according to Bill McCrea (1978: 
9), the founder of the Entrepreneurship Institute. He finds 
a growing confidence among Americans to "do it on their 
own" and thus gain control over their own destinies. He 
asserts that innovation and individuality are still a vital 
part of the American system of beliefs. 
That the idea of laissez-faire individualism is wide-
spread in modern sectors of the United States is further 
evident from recent survey data. The s~riking feature of 
this research is the level of support for this ideology 
throughout the socioeconomic structure. G. Marx (1967:24) 
reports that from a national cross survey, approximately 
two-thirds of the sample of both whites and blacks agreed 
that blacks who want to work hard can get ahead just as 
easily as anyone else. A study conducted by Kallen and 
Miller (1971) concluded that an overwhelming majority of 
both blacks and whites agreed that low-income persons re-
ceiving government benefits were duping the system in lieu 
of working. Finally, in a nationwide survey conducted in 
1969 by Joe Feagin (1975:100-110) to ascertain the level of 
support for the 1aissez-faire ideology, a random sample of 
1,017 adults was tested. The data revealed little differ-
ence among four income groups (less than $4,000 to over 
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$10,000) on the emphasis of individualistic features as the 
cause of poverty. When given a choice among ind.ividualis-
tic, fatalistic, and structural explanations, all four in-
come groups agree that individual factors were the major 
cause of poverty. According to Feagin, the somewhat 
surprising feature was that both the lowest and the highest 
income groups supported this explanation slightly more 
than did the middle income groups. When education was 
held constant, there was a slight increase in the lowest 
income group's support for a fatalistic explanation for 
poverty. Moreover, current recipients of welfare expressed 
the desire to become self-supporting if jobs were available. 
The research of Leonard Goodwin (19 72) ijn his volume, Do 
the Poor Want to Work?, also supports the work ethic aspect 
of this ideology. 
As the classical economic theory (i.e., laissez-faire) 
of Adam Smith has proved to be inadequate as a basis for 
policy decisions, so has the Keynesian doctrine been re-
garded as too narrow in its scope. Yet because of the 
latter's emphasis on fiscal policy, it maintains the illu-
sion that significant redistribution through government 
intervention could occur (Musgrave, 1976:10). Therefore, 
decision makers continue to rely on the ideology imbedded 
in this economic theory to perpetuate the idea that fiscal 
policy can be the tool by which income inequality can be 
reduced. 
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The success of the elitist political ideology stems in 
part from its historical origins. The Founding Fathers 
looked upon elites as essential to a vital and free society. 
de Tocqueville also regarded elites as not only the creative 
and energetic forces of society, but the source which sus-
tains the system (Bachrach, 1967:3-8). Bachrach further 
argues that C. Wright Mills, the foremost antagonist of the 
pluralist' political theory, did not advocate the .abolition 
of the power elite. For Mills, the political solution was 
not to destroy the structure of power, but rather to make 
the decisions of the powerful responsible to the intellec-
tual elite. Ideally the decision makers should be held 
responsible to the people, but since ordinary man lacked 
the knowledge to direct histbry-making decisions, the 
responsibility falls upon intellectuals. Mills' men of 
knowledge must direct society's destiny until conditions 
exist when ordinary men are able to discern the truth 
(Bachrach, 1967:57-58). 
Well established in historical tradition, the capital-
ist elites stand to benefit from the continuation of a 
political ideology which justifies their position as agents 
acting in behalf of the overall society. 
Capitalist Imperative: A Radical 
Perspective 
This researcher will argue that these pervasive 
ideologies have been used by political elites via the media 
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and the educational system to maintain their position and to 
perpetuate the unequal distribution of income and wealth. 
Political elites may be defined as comprising those individ-
uals and/or institutions who regularly have the ability to 
wield a great amount of power and authority which signifi-
cantly affect the distribution of a society's resources. 
These institutions are composed of corporations, multi-
national corporations, and financial institutions controlled 
and owned by wealthy families through financial and politi~ 
cal alliances. This segment of the population is the social 
upper class which has a disproportionate amount of wealth 
and income, controls the major economic institutions of the 
country, and dominates the country's gov~rnmental processes. 
From this definition, the political elites, the ruling 
class, and the capitalist class refer to the same group of 
individuals, families, and/or institutions (Knowles, 1973). 
The power elite is composed of the active, working members 
of this population who influence decisions for the benefit 
of the entire capitalist class (Edwards, 1978:243). It will 
be argued that the state operates in such a way as to 
serve the capitalist class interest in maintaining 
capitalism as a socioeconomic system. To support this 
assertion, the writer will describe four processes by which 
the power elite dominate government activities for the 
benefit of the capitalist class. "State" is used throughout 
this analysis as a generic term referring to government at 
all levels. The generic is justified by the fact that all 
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levels of government share a common functional relationship. 
Though certain sections of the analysis focus on one par-
ticular level of government, it could be applied, with 
slight modifications, to all levels of government. 
William Domhoff (1978:242-252) suggests four processes 
by which members of the power elite, acting on the behalf 
of the ruling class, involve themselves in all levels of 
government. They are: the special interest process, the 
policy-planning process, the candidate-selection process, 
and the ideology process. Each of these will be dealt with 
in an attempt to show how two conflicting functions of 
government have emerged, and how this prevents any signifi-
cant redistribution of income through government 
intervention. 
Special Interest Process 
The special~interest process refers to the means by 
which specific individuals, corporations, or industries 
receive tax breaks, special favors, subsidies, and proce-
dural rulings which are beneficial to their interests. 
This group is comprised of lobbyists, lawyers, trade asso-
ciations, and advisory committees to governmental 
departments and agencies. 
One example of how this process operates is the 
tightly-organized oil lobby. A hired lobbyist serves as 
the industry spokesman at all congressional hearings on the 
issue, makes personal contact with legislators, and makes 
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substantial financial contributions on the industry's 
behalf to cooperative elected officials. The net result is 
that certain aspects of the tax policy involving the deple-
tion of oil are inefficient and inequitable in that they 
yield windfall profits to oil companies. The effect of 
this policy is to raise artificially the taxes paid by 
other taxpayers who do not have the political cohesion and 
strength to eliminate this policy (Haveman, 1973:6). 
Industry advisory committees to the federal government 
have become internal lobbies which perform the dual func-
tion of stopping government from finding out about 
corporation activities, while at the same time, helping 
corporations get inside information about what the govern-
ment is doing. The growth of advisory committees in the 
last decade has served to reserve key governmental access 
points for leaders of the corporate world. The widespread 
and pervasive influence of these committees marks the 
emergence of the American corporate state where political 
power is officially and quasi-officially invested in the 
massive industrial and financial conglomerates (Metcalf, 
1973:58). 
Policy-Formation Process 
The second process, the policy-formation process, is 
the process by which policies on critical issues of state 
are formulated. Here various special-interest groups join 
forces to influence general policies which will benefit 
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capitalists as a group. The central units in this network 
are the Council on Foreign Relations, Committee for Economic 
Development, the Business Council, the American Assembly, 
and the National Municipal League. The financing and 
leadership of these organizations are underwtitten and 
directed by the same group of the upper-class who control 
the major corporations, banks, foundations, and law firms 
(Knowles, 1973:45-50). The major $Ources of the ideas for 
the development of public policy are primarily the research 
laboratories and universities (i.e., "think tanks"). 
The following diagram (Figure 1) illustrates the 
composition of the policy-planning network. This diagram 
indicates that upper-class capitalists concern themselves 
with more than their specific business interests. It 
demonstrates the manner in which leaders from the private 
and public sectors of the economy join forces to discuss 
the problems of the overall system. It suggests that 
members of the power elite involved in government are 
equipped with a general-issue orientation, gained from 
organizations financed by the ruling class, that are 
explicitly policy oriented. Lastly it reveals that the 
upper-middle class experts (i.e., professors, research 
assistants) are hired to dispense their advice to the power 
elite. 
The pervasiveness and diffusion of capitalist class 
influence in effecting public policy can be understood more 
clearly from the flows identified in Figure 1. Knowles 
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(corporations, financial Foundations 
institutions, political Personnel; $ (e.g.' Rockefeller, 
elite--e.g., Rockefeller Carnegie, Ford) 
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Figure 1. Policy Planning Network 
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(1973:343) notes the necessity of identifying the sources of 
the ideas which result in the development of public policy. 
They are primarily the universities' research centers, 
independent research institutions (i.e., Brookings Insti-
tute), and the influential committees (e.g., Council on 
Foreign Affairs, Committee for Economic Development). All 
of these institutions have been strongly influenced by the 
capitalist class (as represented by the Rockefeller Finan-
cial Group in Knowles' analysis) through direct participa-
tion of persons in this class and/or from substantial 
financial contributions. 
This powerful class is in a position to influence not 
only the development, but als<;> the implementa:tion of public 
policy. Members of this class sit on the Council on Foreign 
Affairs and the Committee for Economic Development, and 
directly influence task-farce p0licy recommendations via 
direct participation or promulgation of ideas. These 
recommendations are then implemented into public policy at 
the legislative level of government. Here, too, the 
class's influence is felt through active participation or by 
financial contributions to legislators. These policies 
often benefit the capitalist class as a whole. 
Knowles (1973:354) concludes that the structure and 
exercise of vast economic and political power concentrated 
in the upper-income class is the result of financial and 
political alliance among a relatively few leading families. 
He argues that as long as the corporate world continues to 
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exercise a dominant role in the administration of govern-
ment, a hierarchical power structure in the economic sphere 
will continue to have its political counterpart. 
A prime example of this process is the operation of 
the defense industry. The lion's share of the procurement 
money from the defense budget goes to a small handful of 
giant contractors. Inside the Pentagon are powerful ad-
visory groups (i.e., Defense Industry Council) whose func-
tion is to influence defense policy. In 1969 the board of 
directors included key personnel in Boeing, General 
Dynamics, Brown and Root, Lockheed, and Northrop Corpora-
tion. In addition, three of its members had formerly held 
key positions in the Pentagon. 
The military alliance with the universities dates back 
to World War II when the universities proved to be a gold 
mine of scientific and technical talent that needed only to 
be tapped to enrich the field of weapons research and 
development. Ever since the payoff has gone both ways: to 
the military which benefits by utilizing the brainpower of 
the academic world, and to universities who reap millions of 
dollars annually from defense and defense-related contracts. 
A variety of hybrid educational institutions has grown 
up to serve the needs of military research. These are 
research institutes, "think tanks," and laboratories which 
owe their existence to the defense budget. Some operate in 
loose association with the universities from which they 
originated (i.e., Stanford Research Center); others were 
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created by the Pentagon (i.e., Rand and Logistics Management 
Institute). 
A research scientist on a government contract has moved 
within the Pentagon's sphere of influence and is subject to 
its control. He is no longer free to be openly critical of 
military policies. The fear of falling from favor with the 
Pentagon, of having a contract terminated, or of being 
blacklisted from obtaining future contracts is always 
present. Thus, the circle of capitalist domination 
continues (Kauffman, 1973:135-144). 
Candidate-Selection Process 
In analyzing the candidate-selection process, Domhoff 
(1978:242-252) suggests that the same men who direct cor-
porations and influence policy groups play a central role in 
the careers of most federal legislators by means of campaign 
contributions (see also Tuckman, 1973:80). Furthermore, the 
leaders in opposing parties form coalitions under the 
auspices of policy-planning groups in order to promote over-
all capitalist interests. Thus Domhoff argues that the 
result of the candidate-selection process is the selection 
of political candidates who have few strong policy positions 
of their own and therefore are open to suggestions put forth 
to them by experts who have been legitimated as leaders 
within the framework of the policy-planning process. 
The Self-Interested Policy-Maker Model of government 
(Bates, 1973:26-32) suggests that policy-makers are 
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interested primarily in maximizing their own self interest, 
which is derived from wealth, recognition, and power. Be-
cause staying in office is a requisite for achieving this 
objective, officials will do what is necessary to get re-
elected. An obvious necessity is financing campaigns. 
Se?ator Russell Long (1967:54582) has stated that virtually 
all campaign funds come from businessmen acting in behalf of 
their particular business. Businessmen contribute to 
legislators who support their vested interests. Obtaining 
the financial backing of business interests, then, is an 
essential element of nearly every congressman's political 
life. 
Another strategy employed by corpor,ate elites to 
control the candidate selection process is illustrated by 
the testimony of Committee Chairman Wright Patman. He 
stated that the banking lobby offers large amounts of bank 
stock and bank directorships to committee members, immediate 
loan service to freshmen congressmen, campaign contribu-
tions, and mass mailing to stockholders on behalf of certain 
political candidates (Mintz and Cohen, 1971:208-209). 
Lastly, most congressmen are attorneys by profession. 
Many of them maintain lucrative affiliations with the law 
firms in their home districts. In a study of 50 law firms 
with partners who were elected to Congress, it was found 
that these firms represented the vested interests in 
America: banks, insurance companies, oil and gas interests, 
and giant corporations (Anderson and Pearson, 1968). It is 
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not merely speculation to assume that political favors were 
part of these contracts. 
The serious-minded politician not beholden to any 
wealthy group does exist in the American political system. 
However, a seniority system dominated by ruling class-
oriented politicians has a way of keeping these insurgents 
off the important committees and out of the centers of power 
(Haveman, 1973:7). 
Ideology Process 
The fourth process, the ideology process, is perhaps 
the most important, for it is the means by which the politi-
cal elite creates, disseminates, and enforces a set of 
attitudes and values that perpetuate the idea that, with all 
its defects, the capitalist system is the best of all pos-
sible worlds. At the fount of this process are the same 
foundations and policy-planning groups which operate in the 
policy process. These organizations are responsible for 
providing rationales which make these policies acceptable 
to the general public. Through the transmission of these 
ideologies, capitalists are able to keep alive a notion 
that laissez-faire individualism is a viable option for 
those who seek upward mobility, and that by the application 
of the Keynesian doctrine, government will ultimately 
redistribute income and wealth, and that the political 
elite have the publi~ interest at heart. 
The dissemination network includes middle-class 
discussion groups, public relations firms, corporate-
financed advertising councils, university and foundation 
programs, books, speeches, and efforts of the mass media 
(see also Berger, 1976:40). 
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The dissemination apparatus is readily apparent in the 
area of foreign policy. Domhoff (1978:250) states that the 
Foreign Policy Association and its affiliate, the World 
Affairs Council, provide literature and discussion groups 
for members of the upper-middle class professionals, 
academics, and students. These influential committees also 
sponser Committees on Foreign Relations in over 30 major 
cities in the country. These, commi ttees1 meet regularly to 
hear speakers provided by the Foreign Policy Association. 
The aim of these programs is to provide the local elite with 
information and legitimacy so they may function as local, 
opinion leaders on foreign policy issues. In addition to 
the Foreign Policy Association and the World Affairs 
Council, there are numerous foreign affairs institutes at 
major universities which provide students and the general 
public with the perspectives of the political elite on 
foreign policy. Members of the political elite often play 
an intermediary role in carrying foreign policy positions 
to the general public. This is accomplished via speeches, 
published literature, and the mass media. 
The manner in which these ideologies continue to be 
transmitted for the benefit of the ruling class is 
illustrated by the following flow chart. 
Summary 
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To argue that the government acts primarily in behalf 
of the capitalists, this chapter has demonstrate~ the manner 
in which a governing body of elite manipulates the govern-
ment to its best advantage. Inefficient and inequitable 
public policy exists because powerful vested interests have 
been able to exploit citizens in their roles as taxpayers 
and consumers. The ability of vested interests to accom-
plish this is rooted in their power to ~nfluence congres-
sional votes, regulatory decisions, administrative rulings, 
and to perpetuate ideologies that enhance their position. 
By means of their economic power, their familiarity with 
the channels of government decision-making, and their 
knowledge of the details of policy issues, they are able to 
stave off opposition to programs and policies which provide 
them subisides or confer protected economic positions on 
them (Haveman, 1973:6). 
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CHAPTER IV 
FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT: A RADICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Introduction 
In spite of this mode of economic, political, and 
ideological control, conflict exists in a capitalist society 
as a result of an antagonism between the interests of the 
capitalist class and those of the working class. To main-
tain its position and privileges, capit~lists must insure 
the continuation of the capitalist social organization 
(e.g., markets, property relations, and control over the 
means of production). Therefore, they have a collective 
interest in attempting to create conditions favorable to 
profits and to their ability to accumulate. As long as the 
primary responsipility for organizing production and distri-
bution lies with the capitalists, the State must carry out 
policies that are favorable to this class. For example, 
when policies are pursued which cause profitability of new 
investments to decline, capitalists refuse to reinvest; thus 
precipitating a general economic crisis. By dominating the 
activities of the State, the capitalists are able to insure 
that governmental activities perform the important function 
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of accumulation of private capital. However, because of the 
class-interest conflict inherent in a capitalist society, 
capitalists recognize the government's imperative to main-
tain an additional function: the social harmony or legiti-
mization function, the best example of which is the welfare 
system (O'Conner, 197~:~). 
These two functions, accumulation and social harmony, 
comprise the two fundamental functions of the State. These 
functions are contradictory in a number of ways. This 
researcher will argue that to accomplish each objective, the 
government undertakes a wide variety of budgetary (taxes 
and expenditures) and nonbudgetary (legislation, regulating 
market activity) activities that presumably serve both 
functions. Nominally, government policies which are de-
signed to maintain social harmony equalize the distribution 
of income. In reality, however, they do not have this 
effect. Moreover, many budgetary activities designed for 
other purposes have the latent effect of supporting the 
private accumulation of capital, and indirectly, inequality 
of income. Therefore, it will be argued that because of the 
dual, contradictory functions of the State, a significant 
amount of income redistribution through government inter-
vention is not only unfeasible, it is not possible in a 
society which is controlled by the relatively small body of 
capitalist elites. 
The premise that the government must attempt to serve 
two contradictory functions is based on Marxist philosophy 
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and adapted to budgetary analysis. The State must try to 
maintain or create the conditions in which profitable 
capital accumulation is possible at the same time in which 
it attempts to maintain social harmony. A capitalist state 
that uses overt coercive forces to promote the interests of 
one class at the expense of another loses its legitimacy 
and undermines the basis of its support. Yet a capitalist 
state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process 
of capital accumulation dries up its own source of power 
(e.g., the surplus production capacity of the economy and 
the taxes drawn from this surplus). Thus, the State must be 
continually involved in the accumulation process; but it 
must do so by mystifying its policies by calling them some-
thing that they are not, or it must conceal them by making 
them into administrative rather than political issues. 
O'Conner (1973:5-6) argues that this contradiction explains, 
in part, why former President Nixon called a legislated 
increase in profit rates a job-development credit, why the 
government announces the new fiscal policies are aimed at 
stability and growth, when, in fact, their major purpose 
is to keep profits high and growing, why the tax system is 
theoretically based on the ability to pay, when it is only 
nominally progressive or proportional. 
State Expenditures 
The composition of the government budget (the sum of 
spending and revenue-raising activities) cari best be 
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understood by relating budgetary activities to accumulation 
and legitimization. The two main categories or expendi-
tures according to O'Conner (1973) are: (1) social capital, 
which corresponds to the accumulation function; and (2) 
social expenses, which correspond to the legitimization 
(social harmony) function. These expenditures are called 
social capital and social expenses because they are expendi-
tures for the benefit of special interests groups which are 
financed by society-at-large. 
There are two kinds of social capital: social 
investment and social consumption. Both of these types of 
expenditures contribute to private accumulation either by 
improving the productivity of the labor force or by reducing 
the labor costs that the firm must pay for directly. 
Examples of the first type of social expenditures 
(social investment) are physical investments such as trans-
portation facilities (e.g., highways), industrial-complex 
projects (e.g., subsidized land and facilities provided for 
private firms by state and local governments), and invest-
ments in human capital (e.g., public education, research 
and development, and manpower training programs). These 
expenditures increase productivity by adding to the amount 
of physical and human capital and by improving the tech-
nology that members of the labor force work with. They 
increase the ability of industry to accumulate capital and 
reap the profits, but the cost~ are borne directly by 
taxpayers. 
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Examples of the second type of social capital 
expenditures (social consumption) are those items in the 
budget which provide goods and services that the working 
class can consume collectively. These include hospital and 
medical facilities and social insurance against economic 
insecurity. This type of social capital expenditure often 
serves the legitimization function. However, social 
consumption expenditures add to capital accumulation in that 
without government absorption of these costs, they would 
have had to come out of wage payments. Therefore capital-
ists would be subject to higher wage demands by workers 
(Gold, 1976:96). 
Social expenses are thos~ expenditures which attempt 
to maintain social stability both in the United States and 
wherever United States interests are present throughout the 
world. They do not contribute directly to capital 
accumulation, but are necessary because of the results of 
accumulation. Examples include both the military and police 
and the welfare system. O'Conner (1973:151-167) argues that 
the dual problem of surplus capacity (i.e., unused physical 
equipment) and surplus labor have led to an attempted 
solution in the form of a warfare-welfare state. Military 
expenditures raise demand directly via purchases of equip-
ment. These expenditures are also necessary to protect 
foreign interests of United States industries. Welfare and 
other income supplements represent the strategy employed to 
deal with surplus labor. 
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Social Capital Expenditures 
Social Investment: Physical Capital 
In every advanced capitalist country, monopoly capital 
has socialized part or all of the costs of planning, 
constructing, developing, modernizing, and maintaining 
physical social capital projects (e.g., transportation 
facilities). These projects are socialized partly because 
costs exceed the resources of individual private enter-
prises, or are regarded as unacceptable financial risks by 
corporations and industries immediately involved (O'Connor, 
1973:101). 
By the single measure of total volume, transportation 
outlays, particularly highways expenditures, are the most 
important physical capital investments .. The federal govern-
ment bears 90 percent of the cost of the interstate freeway 
system and SO percent of the cost of other primary roads 
(Kohlmeir, 1973:227). 
There is considerable duplication, overlapping, and 
waste in transport spending which is attributable to the 
influence and power of specific industrial, regional, and 
other private interests at various levels of government. 
This has led to a continuous expansion of budgetary outlays 
for transportation. There is, according to Kohlmeir (1973), 
good reason to expect this trend to continue. The develop-
ment of rapid transit systems together with the extension 
of existing freeway systems promise to push the suburbs out 
even further from the urban centers, adding to the demand 
for additional public spending. 
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There are powerful interest groups whose function is to 
promote the Interstate Highway System. They include the 
American Trucking Association, the American Automobile 
Association, the American Petroleum Institute, and the 
Automobile Manufacturers Association. Government revenues 
and expenditures for highway cbnstruction are funnelled 
through the Highway Trust Fund. Federal excise taxes on 
gasoline, tires, and other highway-use items are principle 
resources for the fund. The 41,000 miles of Interstate 
system roads are fixed by statute. When revenues fail to 
cover anticipated costs, the government increases excise 
taxes (Kohlmeir, 1973:228). This system insures the accumu-
lation of private capital, often at the expense of middle 
and lower-class taxpayers. 
Monopoly capital and organized labor have both 
supported the growth of state-financed social investments. 
From the standpoint of monopoly capital, the greater the 
socialization of social investment costs, the greater the 
profits. From the standpoint of organized labor, the 
greater the socialization of these outlays, the greater the 
rise in productivity and wages (O'Conner, 1973:41). 
Social Investment: Human Capital 
Capital accumulation and economic growth in the 
monopoly sectors depend on the introduction of new 
production processes, new materials, new products, and on 
the integration of science and technology. Indispensable 
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to capital accumulation are the scientific and technological 
research and development services and the well-educated 
scientific, technical, and administrative labor supply. 
Research and development and education are becoming the 
costliest types of social expenditures (Melman, 1973:131-
132). 
Prior to World War II, the industrial and financial 
corporations trained the greatest part of their work forces. 
This proved to be a highly irrational mode of social 
organization. Knowledge and skills, uniike other forms of 
capital over which capitalists claim ownership, cannot be 
monopolized. The discoveries of technology and science are 
widely available throughout the private sector, especially 
in the epoch of mass communications. Capital in the form 
of knowledge resides in the skills and abilities of the 
working class itself. In the context of a free market for 
labor power, a particular industry cannot afford to train 
its own labor force or channel profits into the necessary 
amount of research and development. Nor can any one corpo-
ration afford to train administrative personnel needed to 
plan, coordinate, and control the production and distribu-
tion process. In the final analysis, the state is required 
to finance a large portion of research and development due 
to the high costs involved and the uncertainty of getting 
utilizable results (O'Conner, 1973:111-113; Melman, 1973: 
131-133). 
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The rationalization of the work process (which began as 
a movement that operated on the assumption that the general 
welfare of the community could best be served by satisfying 
the concrete needs of business) required new forms of 
social integration to enable social production to advance 
still further (Dowd, 1977:290). The first step to socialize 
the cost of training was the GI bill. However, this did 
little to increase directly reseach.and development. In the 
1950's and 1960's, the emphasis on the technical progress 
and the expansion of educated labor stimulated a rapid ex-
pansion of lower-level technical educat1on and the estab-
lishment of a base system of higher education by state and 
local government. 
During this same period, there was a transformation of 
many private universities into quasi-federal universities 
via federal research grants and other subsidies, and the 
creation of well-organized comprehensive programs designed 
to exploit technology. This endeavor involved not only the 
education system per se, but also foundations and private 
research organizations. This new system required enormous 
capital outlays, an expansion of teaching and administrative 
personnel, more extensive education, and up-graded educa-
tional facilities (Melman, 1973:133; O'Conner~ 1973:112-
114). The costs of providing this vast source of human 
capital became increasingly socialized during this period. 
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The continued emphasis on technical and scientific 
knowledge and new product development will continue to in-
crease demands on government education and research and 
development budgets. Evidence shows that in 1972 there were 
at least a dozen executive agencies at the federal level 
involved in generating ideas for research and development. 
T~ere were projects which had immediate utility and could 
be adopted by private industry to generate sales, jobs, 
profits, and new investments and exports (Green, 1972:7). 
There is no evidence to indicate that this trend is abating. 
In summary, the process of capitalist economic growth 
requires a rapidly increasing capacity to produce goods and 
services. Increases in the productivity of labor have 
become very important in the growth process. Therefore, 
capitalists have an increasing incentive to expand output 
by raising the productivity of the labor force. This can 
be accomplished, in part, by: (1) increasing the quality 
of labor (e.g., improve productive skills and abilities), 
(2) increasing the amount of capital goods utilized by each 
worker, and (3) by advancing the technology of production 
which enables more output to be produced with a given 
quantity and quality of labor and-capital assets. To the 
extent that these costs are absorbed by the government in 
the form of social investment expenditures, the accumulation 
of private capital via higher profit rates will increase. 
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Social Consumption Expenditures 
The dual and contradictory nature of the accumulation 
and legitimization functi~ns is readily apparent in an 
analysis of social consumption expenditures. Because of the 
nature of both social capital and social expenses, practi-
cally every state expenditure serves these functions 
simultaneously. However, despite this complex social 
character of state expenditures, it is possible to determine 
the primary political-economic forces served by a budgetary 
decision, and thus establish the main purpose of each 
budgetary item. 
There are two types of social consumption expenditures. 
The first type consists of goods and services consumed 
collectively by the working class. Included in this cate-
gory are suburban development projects (e.g., roads, elemen-
tary and secondary schopls, recreational facilities, home 
mortgage subsidies), urban renewal projects, hospital and 
medical facilities. The second type consists of social 
insurance again~t economic insecurity in the form of work-
men's compensation, social security, and unemployment 
insurance. 
Expenditures for education are, in part, a form of 
social consumption for middle and upper-class children in 
the sense that privileged schooling reproduces inequality 
via an intergenerational transmission of the capacity to 
command labor income. Samuel Bowles (1973:317-328) argues 
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that the differential socialization pattern in schools 
attended by students of different social classes do not 
arise by accident. Rather they stem from the fact that the 
educational objectives and expectations of both parents and 
teachers and the responsiveness of students to various 
patterns of teaching and control differ for students of 
different social classes. Bowles further argues that 
inadequate financial support in lower-class school districts 
all but requires that students be treated as raw-materials 
on an assembly line. It places a high premium on obedience 
and punctuality. There are few opportunities for indepen-
dent, creative work or individualized attention by teachers. 
The well-financed schools attended by children of the rich 
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offer much greater opportunity for the development of the 
capacity for sustained independent work and the other 
characteristics required for job performance in the upper 
levels of the occupational hierarchy. 
Thus Bowles suggests that schools have evolved in the 
United States to meet the needs of capitalist employers 
for a disciplined and skilled labor force. Furthermore, 
elementary and secondary education is financed primarily 
through property tax revenue. Since the property tax 
endowment differs widely among communities, there is 
substantial variation in the quality of education offered 
by various communities. Educational outlays ordinarily 
receive a higher priority in middle and upper-class 
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communities than 1n working-class districts (Musgrave, 1976: 
356). 
In recent years, a series of judicial cases have 
challenged the system for funding public schools. These 
challenges have been based on the inequality of the tax 
base among school districts. Those who hoped for education-
finance reform were disappointed by the U.S. Supreme Court's 
1972 decision in San Antonio Independent School District vs. 
Rodriques. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court 
held that the Texas system for funding its public schools 
did not violate the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 
basis of the Court's decision seems sufficiently broad to 
validate the existing financial system of most of the 
states (Musgrave, 1976:33). 
Tuckman (1973:173-181) supports the assertion that 
educational expenditures indirectly increase capital accumu-
lation. His argument is that the public schools play an 
important role in shaping the minds of future generations 
by developing characteristics of punctuality, obedience, 
and discipline in children from lower ind middle~class 
families. By encouraging policies which favor the preser-
vation of the status quo, the dominant class is insuring 
the success of the war for wealth. Tuckman suggests that 
the news media perpetuates the ideology that education 
provides a means by which the intergenerational inequities 
of the past can be redressed so that each new generation 
95 
gets a fresh start; yet day after day the public school 
system trains millions of students to take their proper 
places in the income distribution, with children of the rich 
replacing their parents in the ranks of the wealthy. 
Charles Tiebout (1961:92-93) summarizes the manner in 
which middle and upper-class families manipulate· education 
outlays to aid in perpetuating levels of inequality. He 
argues that the existence of unequal income has led to the 
"tax colony." That is defined as people with high incomes 
banding together in communities which keep low-income 
residents out. This is accomplished by controlling the rent 
and housing price structure. High-priced neighborhoods 
I 
usually have a large wealth base. Therefore, they can levy 
a lower tax. rate to raise money for the schools than poorer 
neighborhoods can. By living in high-priced neighborhoods, 
the wealthy can provide high-quality education for their 
children at a relatively low cost to themselves. 
Social consumption expenditures and their relationship 
to benefits accrued aptly demonstrate the political-economic 
forces behind them. O'Conner (1973:133) argues that these 
outlays are allocated disproportionately between suburban 
and inner-city communities. To understand why this occurs, 
a brief analysis of suburbanization is necessary. 
The development of the suburbs has played a key role 
in the historical development of capitalism. The American 
prosperity of the last three decades owes much to the growth 
of the automobile industry and subsequent suburban 
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development. Ashton (1978:72-73) suggests that as industry 
began moving out of the city, many workers followed to be 
near their jobs. When relatively inexpensive automobiles 
became widely available, even more workers were able to move 
beyond the reaches of mass transit. Confident that a mobile 
labor force would follow them almost anywhere, capitalists 
became more flexible in decentralizing production 
facilities. 
In the suburbs, both capital and labor demanded more 
roads. As the automobile, oil, rubber, and construction 
industries acquired increasing political and economic clout 
to force the building of still more roads, suburban migra-
tion was ·further encouraged. This tended to make the 
automobile an economic and social necessity for each new 
suburban resident. 
The development of suburbs, then, was an interactive, 
snowballing process as the automobile industry and subur-
banization both fed and nourished each other. Together they 
generated an economic boom which altered the social, 
political, and geographical character of urban America. On 
the economic front, suburban development made a significant 
contribution to the ongoing stability of American 
Capitalism. Larry Sawyers (1975:56) calculates that over 
one-fourth of annual GNP is currently dependent upon roads, 
cars, and trucks. When all good~ and services related to 
transportation are included, it is reasonable to assume that 
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well over half of the annual GNP in the United States is now 
tied directly or indirectly to suburbs and suburbanization. 
To boost sporadic and fitful economic activity in the 
suburbs, the federal government enacted various legislative 
measures as early as the 1930's which had a significant 
impact on suburban development. The overall effect of this 
legislation was to create subsidies for the development of 
owner-occupied, single-family dwellings. In 1932, the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation was formed. 
It guaranteed deposits in savings and loan associations. 
These were also granted preferential interest rates which 
enabled them to attract capital with which to finance 
owner-occupied housing. In 1934 the Federal Housing 
Authority was created. This agency provided guaranteed, 
self-liquidating mortgages £or newly-constructed homes. 
Secondly, it required low down payments which allowed many 
middle-class income families to acquire financing. 
During World War II the federal government once again 
engaged in activities which would later come to represent a 
massive subsidy of suburbanization~ Between 1939 and 1946, 
the federal government built nearly $2.5 billion worth of 
industrial buildings annually. Most of these were con-
structed in the suburbs. After the war ended, most of these 
production ~acilities were turned over to private industry 
at a nominal cost. Thus, government policies actually 
subsidized the exodus of housing and labor to the suburbs 
(Ashton, 1978:71-74). 
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The more indirect results of these subsidies is in the 
sphere of consumption. In a commodity-dominated society, 
specific patterns of consumption identify and delineate 
lifestyles with various status groups. Sociologists often 
speak of consumption communities. These are defined as 
groups of people who have a feeling of shared well-being, 
shared risks, common interests, .and common concerns that 
come from consuming the same kinds of services. For in-
stance, an affluent childless couple may select a community 
with lavish recreational facilities, whereas a family with 
children might scrutinize the public school system prior to 
moving into a community. 
Conscious manipulation of consumption expenditures, 
therefore, becomes one tool for any attempt to gain, pro-
tect, or expand privileged characteristics for particular 
groups. The suburb has been an important vehicle for 
specialized consumption expenditures. In these communities, 
specific groups could generate and consume goods and ser-
vices that would tend to reproduce their own particular 
status characteristics and thus protect and expand their 
competitive advantage over time. 
The perpetuation of privilege and status in this 
context can be understood within the framework of welfare 
economics and its key concepts: externalities, spillovers, 
and public goods. Basically, these refer to services avail-
able for consumption by most members of a social group 
once they are provided. Examples of these are elementary 
and secondary schools, recreational, and health facilities 
(Sharp and Olson, 1978:26-31). 
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As well-to-do families gravitate to suburban communi-
ties that provide quality social services financed primarily 
by government expenditures, those communities gain a more 
solid financial base for further expansion of social ser-
vices. This cycle tends to perpetuate communities which are 
able to reproduce particular status characteristics. 
To insure the continuation of this status group, 
suburban residents sought to establish a certain degree of 
homogeneity within the community. A number of mechanisms 
evolved which contributed to this objective. The most 
critical was the conscious manipulation of the suburb's 
public budget. Through selective municipal expenditures 
for roads, sewer systems, schools, etc., a few persons can 
control the overall development of a particular community. 
Zoning restrictions also become a major policy tool 
for maintaining homogeneity in a community. Also, through 
zoning, investment capital can be lured by the prospect 
of special development projects and property tax breaks. 
Even with special reductions, however, corporate taxes 
provide a major source of revenue to suburban municipali-
ties. If enough capital can be recruited, individual 
property taxes can remain low while· still assuring the 
residents that the level and quality of services will 
reproduce their privileged status. 
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It should be noted that there is a delicate balance 
between quality and level of services and a property tax low 
enough not to incite a citizens' revolt. California's 
Proposition 13 is evidence of this problem, yet discussion 
of it is beyond the province of this thesis. California is 
unique in that it experienced a large budget surplus. 
Hence, voters were reluctant to pay increasingly higher 
property taxes when the budget revenues exceeded expendi-
tures. This set off a taxpayers' revolt. These conditions 
are not likely to be duplicated in a large number of states. 
It must be noted that the desire of certain status 
groups to use the suburbs for the protection of privilege 
I 
is not always realized directly. Often these endeavors are 
realized through real estate transactions, land development, 
and banking activities. These interest groups share one 
overriding objective: profitability. It happens that 
historically it has been profitable, both directly and 
indirectly, to construct relatively homogeneous communities. 
Thus, the following trend can be observed: the moderately-
priced tract homes of the 1920's and 1950's, the sprawling, 
single-family subdivisions of the 1960's, and the elaborate 
townhouses and condominium developments of the 1970's 
(Ashton, 1978:73-82). 
In the suburbs elected officials serve a relatively 
homogeneous suburban electorate more-or-less directly. By 
contrast, most central cities have at-large electoral 
systems. Elected officials represent the city as a whole, 
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but tend to serve the wealthy businessmen and other dominant 
private interests. The working-class is underrepresented 
due to their uncoordinated political strength. Thus grants 
from local, state, and federal sources are biased in favor 
of the interests of upper-income classes. For example, 
absentee landlords of residential structures have no direct 
stake in the volume and quality of urban social s~rvices, 
except for police and fire services. These services are 
almost always of superior quality in the central cities. 
Furthermore, citizens' committees, usually consisting of 
bankers and wealthy businessmen, often decide which issues 
will/will not be placed before the public in referendums. 
Hence, social consumption .outlays for the working-class 
families' benefit are not likely to receive a high 
priority (O'Conner, 1973:133). 
It is noteworthy that when the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) was created in 1965, a major 
goal was to assist in the provision of a suitable living 
environment for every American family. Thus a principle 
provision of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan 
Development Act of 1966. was that the federal government was 
to make grants and to provide technical assistance to city 
demonstration agencies to enable them to plan, develop, and 
conduct programs to improve their physical environment, to 
increase their supply of housing for low to moderate income 
families, and to provide educational and social services 
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essential to adequate health and welfare (e.g., Model 
Cities, Community Action Programs). 
The creation of an agency concerned with poverty in 
urban areas gave hopes of new, multi-faceted approaches ·to 
complex cities. Haveman (1977:360-363) noted that these 
approaches have turned out to be inadequate financially, 
inadequate bureaucratically, and inadequate conceptually. 
For example, in 1972, only 42 percent of Model Cities 
expenditures went to the officially-defined poor. Haveman 
suggests that if Model Cities funds had been parceled out 
in large chunks among a few cities, the "model" aspects 
originally envisioned might have had some chance of partial 
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realization; but with too few dollars s~lit among too many 
cities, the planned programs for comprehensive redevelopment 
could not be carried out. 
With regard to Community Action Programs (CAP), 
Haveman (1977:269) argues that minority political incorpora-
tion mainly helped stabilize the American regime by reducing 
racial protest and tensions. John Strange (Haveman, 1977: 
265) summarized the success of the CAP after an extensive 
analysis of both published and unpublished accounts of 
Community Action Programs. His conclusion was that in some 
cases the number of groups contesting for power and in-
fluence has expanded, but that it is generally agreed that 
no radical redistribution of influence, power, or services 
has occurred. 
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Lastly, over-all funding for Community Action Programs 
sharply declined under the Nixon administration. Ulti-
mately, many community action programs became absorbed by 
other governmental agencies, and community action itself 
was eventually dismantled (Haveman, 1977:266). 
Monopoly capitalists have huge fixed investments in 
the decaying central cities. The size and scale of these 
investments dictate that they cannot be abandoned as easily 
as the elite and certain elements of the middle-class work 
force have abandoned their homes there. In order to 
reverse the trend of decay and to revive and guarantee the 
profitability of their investments, capitalists need huge 
outlays from the State in sertices and ~apital investments. 
Hill (1978:213-238) argues that there seems to be a 
general contradiction between the process of urban renewal 
and capital accumulation in the United States that has led 
to the fiscal crisis which is besetting many major cities 
at the present. Capital accumulation requires massive 
urban renewal programs, yet these programs require invest-
ment, consumption, and expense outlays that the market 
cannot handle. This has led to a dramatic increase in the 
role of the State enterprise in the economy, or td what 
Hill calls the State Capitalist City. This is defined as 
an integral unit of corporate state capitalism, which com-
bines state, metropolitan, municipal, and special-district 
forms of organization into an urban political system 
governed according to principles of corporate planning. 
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This system uses the budget as an instrument to raise 
profits in the monopoly private sector. Social expenses 
are transferred into social capital through massive social 
investment and social consumption outlays to monopoly 
industries. This ameliorates the material impoverishment 
of the relative surplus population in the central cities 
by incorporating it into a new stratum of indirectly pro-
ductive workers (e.g., technologists, administrators) who 
plan, implement, and control the new programs in education, 
health, and housing. 
The fiscal burden and overall coordination and control 
of these service programs are increasingly shifted to higher 
I levels of government. The development df centralized 
I 
administrative control, budgetary planning and technocratic 
procedures provides the organizational means to adjust city 
budgetary priorities in favor of monopoly capital accumula-
tion. Thus billions of dollars of state and federal reve-
nues flow into subsidies far new corporate solutions to 
problems of transportation, labor-force development, poilu-
tion control, and crime prevention. More and more larger 
cities are enlisting the aid of the federal government to 
assist them in meeting these rising costs (e.g., New York 
City, Cleveland, Ohio). There is increasing support from 
certain legislative groups to implement a national urban 
policy. This would further socialize rising costs occuring 
in urban-renewal projects. The degree to which this added 
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tax burden would be shifted on to average consumers is not 
known at the present (Tabb, 1978:262). 
The second major group of social consumption expendi-
tures are transfer payments to workers and their families 
in the form of varying kinds of social insurance. All of 
the major social security programs except workmen's compen-
sation were introduced in the 1930's and 1940's. Since 
their inception, social security payments have expanded at 
a rapid rate. Currently the social security system accounts 
for approximately one-fifth of the federal budget (Haveman, 
1977:87). 
Radical sociologi~ts and economists argue that the 
basic purpose of social security is widely misunderstood 
by the public. This perspective argues that the expansion 
of social security is the direct effect of technological, 
cyclical, and other forms of unemployment that accompany 
capitalist economic development. Thus it appears that 
social security benefits should be classified as social 
expenses. However, O'Conner (1973:183-144) argues that 
the primary purpose of the system is to create a sense of 
economic security within the ranks of employed workers, 
and thereby raise morale and reenforce discipline. This 
contribUtes to ~armonious management~labor relations which 
are essential for accumulation and growth of production. 
Thus, the fundamental intent and effect of social security 
is to expand productivity, production, and profits. Seen 
in this dimension, social insurance is not primarily 
insurance for workers, but a type of insurance for 
capitalists and corporations. 
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The flat-rate payroll tax up to a minimum income 
insures that low-income competitive sector workers pay the 
same amount as high-income, monopoly sector workers. The 
benefits of this program are based on income received in 
the past. This policy insures that high-income workers 
receive relatively more benefits-per dollar paid into the 
social security system than low-income workers. This is 
true because when the government finances social security 
costs, the monopoly sector is then willing to implement 
more lucrative retirement plans than the competitive sector 
can afford for its employees. Seen in this way, the system 
encourages the distribution of income from competitive to 
monopoly sector workers. 
Both monopoly capital and labor have favored further 
socialization of this type of social consumption expendi-
tures. Monopoly industries have been willing to socialize 
these costs because of the burden of expensive pension 
plans won by unions through collective bargaining. Unions 
have supported socializing these costs because of member-
ship needs and demands for better and more comprehensive 
medical care and higher and more liberalized pensions. 
Labor negotiators continually urge the federal govern-
ment to expand social insurance programs more rapidly 
(particularly Old Age and Survivors Insurance, i.e., OASI). 
When pensions were a small portion of labor costs, and when 
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wage rates were not administered via collective bargaining, 
monopoly capital's support for OASI was lukewarm. This 
was partly because State pension systems potentially com-
pete with private insurance companies. But, as pensions 
added more to the wages bill, corporate leaders became 
increasingly enthusiastic about raising social security 
benefits and making them more comprehensive. 
Although there is continuing debate over the issues of 
financing OASI, its existence has not been seriously 
threatened by Congressional review. Instead, Congress has 
been willing to raise both the tax base and the combined 
employer-employee tax rate to keep up with the rapid in-
crease in total social security payments experienced during 
' 
the last four decades as a result of demographic changes 
and growing benefits per recipient. Between 1937 and 1974 
the tax rate was increased 12 times, and the tax base was 
raised seven times (Musgrave, 1976:682). Under current law 
the base will reach $30,000 by 1986. Even though such an 
increase will not generate sufficient revenue to fund 
anticipated claims, recent Congressional debate has revolved 
around ways to generate even more revenues, rather than ways 
to reduce the role of the system in providing benefits for 
retirees (Pechman, 1976:207-247). 
At present, organized labor is more or less satisfied 
because the system redistributes income in their favor. 
Monopoly capital is also relatively happy because the system 
insures comparative harmony with labor. If the monopoly 
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sector workers were compelled to contribute as much as they 
receive upon retirement, they would experience a sharp 
reduction in current wages. If retired workers received 
what they actually paid in, retirement benefits would be 
impossibly low. In either event, monopoly-sector labor-
management relations would be impaired seriously. Workers 
would resist technological changes that threatened their 
jobs; and the ability of unions to maintain discipline 
would be impaired. This would lead to reduced productivity 
and an ultimate decrease in capital accumulation. 
Of course, the political system does not permit 
monopoly capital to translate its economic requirements 
directly into effective legislation and ~udgeting. Capital-
ists must contend for power with other income classes. 
Therefore, due to the effort of other progressive political 
forces, social insurance benefits have been extended to 
many small businesses in the competitive sector. Thus the 
system continues to expand not only because of the economic 
requisites of monopoly capital but because of the political 
forces at work in the society as a whole and the State's 
need to win mass loyalty (Ukockis, 1968:10). 
This section has analyzed the aspects of government 
budgetary activity which directly add to the accumulation. 
of private capital. It was argued that the growth of the 
public sector is functioning increasingly as the basis for 
growth of the monopoly sector. The monopoly sector requires 
more and more social investment in relation to private 
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capital. The costs of such investments are not borne to a 
great extent by the monopoly sector, but rather are social-
ized and fall on the State. In short, the monopoly sector 
socializes more and more costs of production. 
The budgetary expressions employed to promote capital 
accumulation take many forms: physical capital investments, 
outlays for research and development, and a variety of 
social consumption expenditures (e.g., education outlays, 
suburban development, urban renewal, social insurance 
against economic insecurity). 
The impact of the accumulation function of government 
has been to maintain and reproduce the capitalist class . 
. This has been accomplished, in part, by means of a coordi-
nated defense of capitalist class interests via the influ-
ence of budgetary outlays at all levels of government. 
Social Expenses 
Introduction 
In the 19th century, private capital paid for a 
relatively large portion of social expenses. Police and 
other repressive forces were financed privately. The 
welfare system was primarily the responsibility of private 
charity. In the early 20th century, monopoly capital 
attempted to finance its own social expenses through a sys-
tem known as welfare capitalism. This technique was unsuc-
cessful in that no one corporation could effectively plan or 
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finance a system designed to maintain harmony in the social 
sphere (Feagin, 1975:29-43). Thus, over time there has been 
a tendency for the State to socialize these expenses. 
Currently the two major social expenses are the welfare 
system and the defense budget. Both of these types of 
expenditures are determined by the needs of monopoly capital 
and the relations of production in the monopoly sector. 
Surplus capital creates political pressures for aggressive 
foreign expansion. Surplus labor power exacerbates the 
need for the welfare system. O'Conner (1973) and Reich 
and Finkelhor (1976) argue that the structural determinants 
of both military spending and welfare outlays can be inter-
pretted as different aspects of the same general phenomenon. 
The welfare state tends to expand because of the 
growth of a surplus labor population which has relatively 
little purchasing power of its own. The warfare state tends 
to expand because of the expansion of surplus capital and 
a surplus labor supply which cannot be disposed of at home. 
The problem of maintaining an adequate level of aggregate 
demand is a problem of expanding markets and investments 
abroad and subsidizing unemployed workers at home. There-
fore, both welfare and warfare spending have a two-fold 
nature: to facilitate growth and to maintain social har-
mony. The function of the welfare system is not only to 
maintain social harmony, but to expand the domestic market. 
The warfare system not only contributes to keeping labor 
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power, raw materials, and markets in the capitalist orbit, 
but it helps stave off domestic economic stagnation. 
Military Expenditures 
As early at 1956, C. Wright Mills (1956:18) was cogni-
zant of the interrelationship between the national govern-
ment, the military apparatus, and the national economy. He 
defined the power elite as the political, economic, and 
military circles which, because of an intricate set of over-
lapping cliques, share decisions having at least national 
consequences. 
Recent studies have been conducted to determine how 
important the military market is for the American economy. 
In the late 1960's, the military had 3.5 million uniformed 
personnel and 1.2 million civilian employees. These workers 
were located at over 2,250 locations both at home and 
abroad. It was estimated that an additional three million 
workers employed in private industry worked directly on 
military production. Over 60 percent of all United States 
scientists, engineers, and technicians are employed on 
research and development projects supported by the military. 
These studies have also revealed much concerning the 
structure of the decision-making process which determines 
the size and allocation of the defense budget. In particu-
lar, the complex web of interaction between military 
personnel, private corporations, and the legislature have 
been clarified. While a handful of very large contractors 
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that derive revenues from defense contracts is highly 
visible in this process, it is less widely known that over 
15,000 corporations possess military contracts. They are 
located in each of the SO states. This geographical dis-
tribution is reenforced by the existence of over 100 members 
of Congress holding military reserve commissions who serve 
on various armed services and veterans affairs committees. 
These same corporations also influence military decisions 
in the executive branch of government. One recent study 
found over 2,000 former officers employed in major defense-
related firms (Haveman, 1973:97-99). 
The capitalist elites have a vested interest in 
perpetuating an ideology that makes massive defense outlays 
acceptable to the public. Historically, this has been 
accomplished via the idea of geographic expansion as a 
necessary requisite for economic growth. This ideology 
has been paralled by the ideology of anti-communism which 
justifies America's intrusion into foreign territory. ·The 
increasing instability of the world capitalist social order 
and the birth of new socialist societies have helped to 
justify increased military spending by the United States. 
Both of these tactics have been powerful forces in ration-
alizing defense spending as well as a general legitimizer 
of capitalism (Berger, 1976:34-43). 
Reich and Finkelhor (1976:187-193) argue that there 
are several reasons why the military market is important 
if capitalism is to continue. The fluctuation of military 
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spending has virtually determined the cyclical pattern of 
the economy. Declines in military spending have been 
followed by declines in economic growth. Only military 
spending via the government can expand so freely and thus 
encourage economic growth without damaging the basic frame-
work of the domestic economy. It does not compete with the 
private sector, and it absorbs a significant amount of the 
surplus labor supply. Moreover, with the rise in tech-· 
nology, the demand for weaponry is a bottomless pit. Many 
new weapons systems are obsolete before final production 
has taken place. The kind of machinery needed for armament 
production is highly specific to particular armaments. Each 
time a new weapon is needed or a new process created, all 
existing production machinery must be scrapped. This 
process is highly profitable for corporations with defense-
related contracts as the government subsidizes most of the 
costs of capital equipment. O'Conner (1973:155) states 
that the resources of most the these corporations are so 
specialized, the emphasis on quality and technology rather 
than on volume and low price is so great, and the absence 
of mass distribution is so pronounced, that _they are unable 
to shift a significant amount of resources to nonmilitary 
production. Hence, these companies tend to be subsidized 
by the State indefinitely. 
In addition, companies do not lose their ~rivileged 
status if their weaponry does not meet specifications or 
perform properly. Reich and Finkelhor (1976:192) report a 
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recent study of 13 major aircraft and missile programs since 
1955 which cost a total of $40 billion. Only four of these 
performed as much as 75 percent of the design specifica-
tions. Yet the companies with the poorest performance had 
reported the highest profits. 
What this amounts to is that profits for defense work 
are extremely high. This is obscured by the Defense Depart-
ment which releases profits computed as a percentage of 
sales or costs. In the normal business world, profits are 
figures as a percentage of investment. Defense contractors 
invest little of their own money, as government expenditures 
pay for the bulk of the costs of capital equipment. A study 
by Murray Weidenbaum (1965:46-52) indicated that defense 
contractors showed that between 1962 and 1965, they earned 
17.5 percent on investment. This figure corresponds to 
10.6 percent profit rate for civilian market earnings. 
Sherman (1976:200) provides further evidence to support this 
assertion. A study by the General Accounting Office of the 
U.S. government has spelled out the high profit rates of 
military firms. From 1966-1969, these firms admitted an 
average profit rate of 24.8 percent. Spot checks of these 
firms by the General Accounting Office found the profit 
rates to be as high at 56.1 percent rate of return on 
invested capital. In addi t.ion to understating the profit 
rate, this study illuminated the fact that these firms make 
many hidden profits through the use of complex subcontract-
ing procedures to subsidiaries, unauthorized use of 
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government-owned property, and getting patents on research 
done for the government. 
Radical political economists and sociologists argue 
that the waste and profiteering are not aberrations or 
mistakes. Massive, wasteful military spending is allowed 
to exist because it fulfills a need of the system as a 
whole. The waste is what helps wa;fare spending perform 
its primary function: providing a cushion to ward off 
stagnation and economic crisis. 
Sherman (1976:198-199) asserts that there is an auto-
matic and inherent pattern of business cycles that has been 
overlaid with a politically-motivated business cycle. When 
there is an all-out business boom, capitalists influence 
government to reduce military spending. This reduction is 
desired to avoid inflation and to avoid full employment 
which means higher wage bills. 
In summary, Sherman argues that big business is 
satisfied with the high level of defense expenditures for 
two predominant reasons. First, on the aggregate level, 
military spending is used to protect United States invest-
ments abroad, to get the economy out of a recession, and to 
prevent a major depression. Secondly, due to the influence 
of the Military-Industrial Complex in government decision-
making, those who advocate large budgetary expenditures for 
defense are those who stand to profit the most from the 
subsequent contracts. Therefore, perhaps by accident, or 
perhaps by design, military spending is one of the 
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mechanisms by which higher income groups use the government 
to prevent income redistribution from occurring. 
Welfare Expenditures 
The radical view presupposes that unemployment and/or 
inflation is the usual state of capitalism and that the 
fiscal measures required to solve these problems cannot be 
taken by capitalist government, because powerful vested 
interests oppose them. From this perspective, even the 
welfare programs specifically designed to benefit the poor 
never threaten the overall structure of inequality (Edwards, 
1978:309). 
Capitalism itself imposes real limits on welfare 
policies that could effect a significant redistribution of 
income and/or wealth. Welfare programs are specifically 
designed to accomodate the two major functions of govern-
ment: accumulation and social harmony. By redistributing 
income from the nonpoor to the poor, the purchasing power 
of the lower-income stratas is increased. This indirectly 
affects the accumulation of pr~vate capital by increasing 
aggregate demand. The social harmony function of govern-
ment is accomplished through a welfare system designed to 
keep the poor from becoming rebelliously poor. 
It is politically expedient for capitalists to 
camouflage the actual functions of the welfare system in 
order to maintain social control. Therefore, considerable 
political rhetoric, beginning in the early 1960's has been 
accompanied by the implementation of numerous government 
policies whose overt objective has been to eradicate 
117 
poverty (Haveman, 1977:3). Haveman noted, however, that 
except for general concern with unemployment and the econom-
ic position of the Blacks generated by the Civil Rights 
Movement, there was no organized group demanding new pro-
grams for the poor. Similarly there was no history of party 
platforms that assigned this problem a particularly high 
priority. Also, there was no apparent surge of public 
opinion designating poverty to be the central domestic 
policy problem. 
Piven and Cloward (1971:13) note that the key to 
understanding relief-giving is in the functions it serves 
for the larger economic and political order. Historical 
evidence suggests that welfare benefits are initiated or 
expanded during outbreaks of civil disorder produced by 
mass unemployment and then abolished or contracted when 
political stability is restored. 
Much of the 1950's and the early 1960's were marked by 
higher than normal unemployment rates. Coupled with the 
rise in the Civil Rights Movement, it became necessary to 
expand relief measures to bolster a sagging economy and to 
pacify the insurgents. The 1964-1974 decade witnessed a 
tremendous growth in government expenditures which were 
allegedly designed to enhance the productive capacity of 
the individual. There were programs designed to grant the 
poor the opportunity for increased participation in their 
community; legislation was implemented to insure equal 
opportunity in employment and housing. 
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This menu of programs, developed as part of the War on 
Poverty, reflects the judgment that public measures could 
alter both the performance of the economy and improve the 
economic status of the poor. O'Conner's (1973:5-7) thesis 
is that a large portion of these outlays traditionally 
classified as social expenses (e.g., social insurance, 
public assistance, veterans benefits) simultaneously serve 
the more important function of adding to the accumulation 
of private capital. 
Traditional programs designed specifically to benefit 
the poor (e.g., AFCD, Medicaid, food stamps) have not in-
creased rapidly enough to alleviate poverty. Furthermore 
traditional budgetary welfare classifications excluded 
expenditures for social insurance and education (Merriam 
and Skolnik, 1968). Only when this classification scheme 
changed to include these outlays could politicians document 
any advance in alleviating poverty through increased social 
expenses outlays. 
There is no rationalization in the capitalist scheme 
to justify massive social spending in areas that benefit 
the poor specifically. Reich and Finkelhor (1976:194-198) 
introduce several arguments that aid in understanding why 
a government whose activities are dominated by a capitalist 
elite could not advocate welfare spending to the degree that 
they endorse military spending. 
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Investments in social facilities are usually durable; 
they do not become obsolete very quickly nor are they 
rapidly consumed. Hence, there is not the unlimited market 
for these services as ther~ is for weaponry. 
Secondly, the technology of social welfare facilities 
(e.g., hospitals) is relatively static in most areas. Very 
conventional standards are available to establish costs. 
There is little possibility here for enormous padding to 
absorb government grants to aid private industry. 
Thirdly, there are generally accessible measures to 
ascertain how adequately social needs have been met. Con-
versely, there are no agreed-upon measures of how much 
defense we have. The general public have little way of 
adequately questioning the judgment of decision-makers 
with regard to national defense. 
However, these are not the most important reasons why 
massive social spending is unfeasible. Basically it is not 
feasible because it inevitably interferes with the basic 
operations of a capitalistic system (Sherman, 1976:194; 
O'Conner, 1973:158-163; Reich and Finkelhor, 1976:195-197). 
First, many kinds of social spending put the government 
in direct competition with the private sector which produces 
goods and services. The consensus among capitalists seems 
to be that it is acceptable for the government to finance 
goods and services that the private sector produces, but it 
is not acceptable for the government to produce them. For 
example, if th~ government built low-cost housing in large 
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amounts, it would cut heavily into the profits of private 
builders and landlords who own the existing housing stock. 
Similarly, a larger public mass transportation system would 
compete seriously with the automobile industry. 
Secondly, an adequate welfare program would seriously 
disrupt the labor market by making it difficult for employ-
ers to get workers. If the government would provide ade-
quate nonwage income without social stigma, many workers 
would drop out of the labor force rather than take low-
paying, unpleasant jobs. Those who stayed at jobs would 
be less likely to put up with demeaning working conditions. 
The whole basis of the capitalistic labor market is that 
workers have no income source othet thaJ from their labor 
power. Capitalistic ideology has maintained a cardinal 
rule that government must not interfere with the incentive 
to work. Powerful political forces operate to insure that 
direct income subsidization at adequate levels does not 
materialize (see also Tussing, 1975). 
Moreover, massive social service spending is opposed 
because it threatens the class structure. For example, 
education expenditures which would insure a universal, 
quality education extending through college is opposed. 
Historically, education has been a critical stratification 
mechanism whic~ has reproduced the inequality necessary in 
a capitalistic economy (see also Tuckman, 1973). 
Finally, social services which give people sufficient 
security, comfort, and satisfaction interfere with the 
121 
market in consumer goods. Corporations can only sell people 
goods in an economy of abundance by playing on their un-
satisfied needs and yearnings. In an era in which the most 
basic necessities have been provided, new needs are artifi-
cially created (e.g., the need for status, sex appeal). 
These needs are continually pandered to by the commercial 
world. If these needs were met by the public sector, it 
would interfere with demand for consumer products in the 
private market (see also Toffler, 1970; Gouldner, 1970). 
This section has examined the rationale behind welfare-
warfare outlays and their relationship to the present 
capitalistic economy. There are two conclusions that de-
serve recapitulation. First, the capita~ist elite are not 
going to endorse a move away from military expenditures. 
The military sector is too crucial to capitalist stability 
and to capitalist profits. Secondly, the problem in 
America has not been merely that too little money goes into 
social spending. Rather the problem centers around 
capitalist priorities (e.g., accumulation). The priority 
of production for profit and corporate aggrandizement takes 
precedence over the satisfaction of the real needs of 
individuals in the society. 
CHAPTER V. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main concerns of fiscal politics (the investigation 
of the sociological foundations of government finances) are 
to discover the principles governing the volume and alloca-
tion of the State expenditures and the distribution of tax 
burdens among various economic classes. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1954:7) has written that: 
Public finances are one of the bes~ starting 
points for an investigation of society . . . 
This is true both of the causal significance of 
fiscal policy (insofar as fiscal events are an 
important element in the causation of all change) 
and of their symptomatic significance (insofar as 
everything that happens has its fiscal reflec-
tion) ... we may surely speak of ... a spe-
cial field: fiscal sociology, of which much may 
be expected. 
The emphasis in much current sociological research is 
focused on developing a fuller understanding of subunits 
within a total society. Therefore, there is a paucity of 
sociological literature which focuses on the aggregate 
economic dimensions of society. One of the objectives 6f 
this research has been to contribute to the neglected area 
of fiscal sociology which addresses itself to government 
expenditures and taxation. 
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From this perspective, the contributions of this 
research have been twofold. First a synthesis of the avail-
able literature has furnished a more complete account than 
has heretofore been developed concerning the role of 
government in redistributing income. 
Secondly, by analyzing the unobserved function of 
government budgetary activities, an alternative explanation 
for its failure to redistribute income significantly is 
provided. The previous researchers have tended to concen-
trate on the manifest functions of the budget. Such an 
approach can determine whether the government has/has not 
had a significant effect on the distribution of income, but 
it rarely attempts to explain the reason. It is only when 
one begins to probe more deeply into the unobserved func-
tions performed by the government budget that one is able 
to provide a meaningful explanation. 
This thesis, then, has dealt with the role of organized 
vested power in determining the structure and content of 
government decisions and with the equity consequences of 
this power. The dilemma which this research has elucidated 
can be stated as follows (Posner, 1971:119): 
Government is omnipresent--regulating, subsidiz-
ing, allocating--and it is highly susceptible to 
manipulation by well organized groups. It is in 
the nature of democratic government that a numer-
ous, durable, articulate, and focused interest 
group, able to organize financial and field sup-
port for political campaigners, to propagandize, 
to draft and to shepherd bills through legisla-
tures, to maintain continuous contact with regu-
latory officials, and to mobilize voters, will 
wrest privileges and benefits from government 
and thwart efforts to control its behavior. Con-
sumers, citizens, taxpayers constitute too diffuse 
and amorphous a group to compete in this league 
. . The very democratic structure that we so 
highly--and rightly--prize facilitates the plun-
dering of taxpayers and consumers by interest 
groups able to use powers of government for their 
own ends. 
This research began with the assumption that to the 
extent that the behavior described above is accurate, it 
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would be reflected in a static distribution of aggregate in-
come over time, in spite of a rise in government 
expenditures as a percentage of Gross National Product. 
The traditional Current Population Survey data reveal 
that the size di~tribution of income in the United States 
has remained basically stable since World War II. However, 
a review of the literature raised serious doubts as to the 
reliability of this measure, ~specially in the face of 
growing social welfare expenditures, a presumably progres-
sive tax system, and governmental efforts to fight infla-
tion. It was somewhat surprising, therefore, to find that 
adjustments for each of these factors failed to indicate 
that government fiscal or monetary policy has significantly 
redistributed income over the post-World War II period. 
Several welfare expenditures (especially the in-kind bene-
fits not included in the CPS data) have tended to increase 
the real income of the lowest quintile. This increase has 
been offset, however, by the essentially proportional inci-
dence of taxation over the entire income spectrum, and by 
the adverse effect of anti-inflation policy on the lowest 
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quintile. The evidence presented appears to support the 
first hypothesis that the government has not significantly 
redistributed income in the last three decades. 
The second major section of the thesis provided a 
radical explanation for why inefficient and inequitable 
government policies have developed, and why they are so 
resistant to reform. This view suggests that government is 
a vehicle used to maintain and sustain the economic power of 
those who already have it. This perspective further asserts 
that in modern capitalism, the State must intervene directly 
in an increasing variety of ways in the functioning of the 
economy in order that the pri~ileges and hegemony of private 
capital not be eroded. Thus control over the State apparat-
us becomes increasingly important for the capitalist class; 
and the links between private business and the State become 
ever closer. 
In today's system of political economy, poorer 
citizens, in their capacity as taxpayers and consumers, con-
front major obstacles in exercising their interest through 
government policy. Because they are unorganized, uninformed 
on technical details of public issues, and without a 
specially designated spokesman to advance their case in the 
process through which tax laws are written, spending pro-
grams developed, and regulatory decisions made, their 
interests tend to be submerged and/or ignored. Thus this 
thesis argued that a relatively small group of capitalist 
elites have gained access to all critical levels of 
I 
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government, through which they have been able to influence 
key budgetary activities that promote their interests. As 
a result, what has evolved is a capitalist government with 
two often contradictory and conflicting functions: accumu-
lation and legitimization, the most important of which is 
the former. 
Evidence to support the proposition that practically 
all government budgetary expenditures aid the accumulation 
function was presented. The net result is a society whose 
government cannot significantly redistribute income if the 
capitalist economic system is to survive. 
The purpose of documenting inadequacies in the perfor-
mance of government has not been to set the stage for 
revolution and the destruction of capitalism. Rather is has 
been to illuminate the facts of and causes for inequitable 
governmental performance, to convey this information to 
those concerned with the operation of government, and to 
alert those who are not yet concerned. 
One final point remains to be made. Ralph Nader 
(1973:270-275) notes that there is an observed tendency of 
policymakers to resist efforts to probe into the functioning 
of government. For instance, the Freedom of Information 
Act (1967) which came in on a wave of liberating rhetoric 
is being undermined by bureaucratic ingenuity. The act 
explicitly provides for nine exemptions which offer a vast 
amount of bureaucratic discretion in releasing information. 
If this analysis of the role of vested interests in the 
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determination of major budgetary expenditures is correct, 
the lack of cooperation from policymakers in releasing in-
formation to the interested public should not be surprising. 
Such probing can only have the result of exposing alliances 
of policymakers and vested interests and the effect of 
these alliances. Perhaps the chief weapon of the political 
elite are those of secrecy and obfuscation. The less that 
people know or understand about what the government does, 
the more secure are the political elite. 
Therefore, this research presents neither a formula 
for action nor a recipe for reform. Its objective has been 
to educate and to inform. This researcher accepts the 
proposition that the improved perception of increasing 
numbers of citizens of what government does and who controls 
its activities will lead ultimately to more effective and 
more democratic government. 
Anderson, 
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